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THE INSURER'S RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
OF DEFENSE COSTS
Robert H. Jerry, II*

In the various iterations of personal and commercial liability insurance
policies commonly used in the United States, the insurer owes the policyholder
two primary duties: a duty to indemnify the insured against liabilities the insured
incurs to third parties for claims within the policy's coverage, and a duty to defend
the insured against such claims when asserted in litigation brought against the
insured.' The insurer's obligation under the duty to indemnify is bounded by virtue
of the policy's monetary limits, but the insurer's undertaking under the duty to
defend is rarely subjected to any similar limitation.2 Thus, although the insurer has
the certainty of knowing the maximum extent of its exposure under the
indemnification obligation, the insurer faces uncertainty with respect to the
potential magnitude of the costs of defending the insured against claims filed by
third parties.
As a percentage of total claims costs, the expense of providing defenses
to insureds is considerable. According to industry data, approximately fourteen
percent of expenditures on claims is attributable to defense costs.' If this figure is
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*
Missouri-Columbia. The Author thanks William Barker, James Devine, Roger Henderson,
Robert Lawless, Ellen Smith Pryor, Robert Pushaw, Jeffrey Stempel, Jean Stemlight, and
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to Lisa Chase, J.D., 1999, and Jeff Lasswell, J.D., expected 2001, University of MissouriColumbia, for their helpful research assistance, and his gratitude to the trust of the Missouri
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Article.
I.
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § Ill [a], at 729
(2d ed. 1996).

2.

"Defense within limits" coverage provides the exception to the general rule.

See infra notes 5-6.
3.
See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE FACT BOOK 1999:
PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE FAcTs 57 (1998). This data, compiled for the Institute by
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, estimates that 46% of the dollars spent on liability claims
(totaling approximately $161 billion in 1995) compensate injured victims for losses (24%
for actual economic loss and 22% for pain and suffering loss), 24% goes to administrative
expenses, and 16% compensates claimants' lawyers. This implies that almost one-third of
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correct, then more than $20 billion is spent each year by U.S. insurers on defense
costs. Thus, it is understandable that for much of the last two decades, insurers
have devoted considerable attention to acquiring more control over such costs." In
the 1980s, during the most recent cycle that stressed the insurance industry's
capacity to meet demand for coverage, the industry flirted briefly with so-called
defense within limits ("DWL") policies (also sometimes called "self-consuming"
or "burning limits" policies), under which the costs incurred in defending claims
served to reduce, according to some sort of specified formula, the policy limits
available for indemnification.5 Regulatory and policyholder concern with the
implications of making the duties to defend and to indemnify interdependent was
significant, but these concerns essentially were tabled when industry interest in
DWL coverage waned due to softening liability insurance markets."
Another feature of industry practice has had considerably more staying
power in recent years. Insurers have been much more aggressive in managing their
relationships with attorneys and law firms retained to defend claims filed against
policyholders. In this regard, insurer-imposed constraints on fees and billing
practices have become widespread, often to the considerable consternation of the
insurance defense bar.' Likewise, some insurers have aggressively promoted the
use of in-house staff counsel to defend claims filed against policyholders, as

total expenditures can be traced to the civil liability system, even though only one-third of
claims mature into litigated suits and only 2% are resolved by court verdicts. See id. The
14% figure is larger than some earlier estimates. For other data, see Charles Silver, Flat
Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law
Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 205, 216 n.39 (1997) (citing

other sources placing figure for 1988 at approximately 9% of $132 billion), and Robert I.
McMurry, Environmental Contamination, California,34 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 967, 996 n.5 (Aug.
16, 1995) (citing a 1992 study by the RAND Corporation calculating that nearly 90% of
insurance industry expenditures in cleaning up toxic waste sites cover legal fees).
4.
This Article focuses on defense costs as an element of total claims costs in
liability insurance, but it should be noted that the insurance industry in recent years has
addressed, with some success, the high level of overall legal spending. Relative to other
industries, insurance firms spend a much larger percentage of total revenues on legal
expenses, but total legal spending as a percentage of world-wide revenues declined from a
median of .54% in 1992 to .32% in 1998 due to cost-control efforts. See Amanda Levin,
Insurers Decrease Overall Legal Spending, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FIN.
SERVS. EDITION, Jan. 25, 1999, at 38 (referring to Price Waterhouse Law Department
Spending Survey).
5.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § I Ij], at 762-63.
6.
DWL policies are available in some discrete markets, but they are not
currently in widespread use. For more discussion, see Shaun McParland Baldwin, Legal
and Ethical Considerationsfor "Defense Within Limits" Policies, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 89

(1994); Silver, supra note 3, at 235 n.93 ("Increasing numbers of liability insurance
policies contain defense-within-limits provisions that eliminate the duty to defend when
defense costs exceed a specified amount, usually the remaining policy limits.").
7.
See Douglas R. Richmond, The Business and Ethics of Liability Insurers'
Efforts to Manage Legal Care,28 U. MEM. L. REv. 57 (1997); Silver, supra note 3, at 207.
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opposed to retaining outside counsel.8 The practice has not been without
controversy, although it has been upheld in almost all cases where it has been
challenged.9 At the bottom line, insurers' interests in using staff counsel to defend
claims is a function of the desire to acquire more control over and, ultimately, to
reduce defense costs.
Asserting entitlement to reimbursement of defense costs incurred when
defending claims outside coverage is one additional way insurers have sought to
reduce the portion of total claims costs devoted to providing a defense. Although
reimbursement of defense costs had been recognized as a possibility for at least a
decade and had been approved in some cases, it was not until the California
Supreme Court's July 1997 decision in Buss v. Superior Court0 that any court
either explored the right in detail or articulated a convincing theoretical rationale
for it. Since then, the reimbursement issue has received much more attention."
Given the detailed discussion and ultimate approval of a limited reimbursement
right in Buss, it is inevitable that insurers in many other jurisdictions will ask
courts both to recognize the right and to extend its limited scope.' 2

8.
See, e.g., Leo J. Jordan & Hilde E.Kahn, Ethical Issues Relating to Staff
Counsel Representation of Insureds, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 25, (1994); Ronald E. Mallen,
Defense by Salaried Counsel: A Bane or A Blessing?, 61 DEF. COUNs. J. 518 (1994); Silver,
supra note 3, at 240-45.
9.
See Silver, supra note 3, at 244-45.

10.

939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).

!1.
See, e.g., William T. Barker, Appellant's Brief. Arch-Angel Insurance
Company v. Walter Raleigh: A Hypothetical Case on Recoupment of Defense Costs, 19 INS.
LITIG. RPTR. 533 (1997); Timothy S. Menter, Expansion of the Duty to Defend in
California, 20 INs. LrrIG. RvrR. 3, 6 (1998); Michael Sean Quinn, Appellee's Brief ArchAngel Insurance Company v. Walter Raleigh: A Hypothetical Case on Recoupment of
Defense Costs, 19 INS. LrIG. RPm. 588 (1997); Douglas R. Richmond, Reimbursing
Insurers' Defense Costs: Restitution and Mixed Actions, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 457, 458,
490 (1998); Dennis J. Wall, Insured's Reimbursement ofInsurers' Defense Expenses: Some
PracticalSteps, 65 DEF. CouNs. J. 68 (1998). Some of the post-Buss interest focuses on

ethical issues. See infra note 13. For earlier discussions of the issue, see generally Michael
J. Brady & Susan H. Handelman, Insurer's Right to Reimbursement: Neglected But
Valuable Remedy, 59 DEF. COUNSEL J. 547 (1992), Richard C. Giller, A Further
Explanation as to Why Insurers Are Entitled to Seek Reimbursement of Defense Costs, 17
INS. LITIG. RPTR. 319 (1995), Richard C. Giller, An Insurer'sRight to Seek Reimbursement
of Defense Costs: A National Perspective, 17 INS. LITIG. RPTR. 132 (1995), Judith F.
Goodman, Can Insurers Recover Defense Costs When There is No Defense Obligation?,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 1992, at 1, and Brent E. Johnson, A Policyholder'sPerspective:A Reply
to Richard Giller's Article "Insurer'sRight to Seek Reimbursement of Defense Costs: A
NationalPerspective," 17 INS. LITIG. RPTR. 252 (1995).
12.
Texas probably will be one of the next state supreme courts to consider the

issue; review was recently granted of an appellate court decision discussing the insurer's
reimbursement right. See Matagorda County v. Texas Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk
Management Pool, 975 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), review granted (June 24, 1999).
The issue is likely to be raised in other jurisdictions as well. See Michael R. Brown &
Thomas Bright, CarriersGiven Sledgehammer to Aid in Recovering Fees, CORP. COuNs.,
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This Article examines the theoretical justification for the insurer's
asserted right to reimbursement of defense costs incurred in defending noncovered
claims. 3 Part I sketches some details about ihe duty to defend which are necessary
prerequisites to exploring any claim to a right of reimbursement. Part II discusses
the rationale offered by most courts and commentators for recognizing the right to
Oct. 1997, at I ("As a result of [Buss], insurance carriers throughout the country are likely
to begin filing reimbursement lawsuits against their policyholders."); Richmond, supra note
11, at 458, 490 (observing that effect of Buss will extend beyond California's borders).
Insurers are more likely to seek reimbursement in situations where the underlying lawsuit
was complex and expensive to litigate. Insurers will be less likely to seek reimbursement
from individuals under homeowners and other personal liability forms, given the lower
returns and the ill-will such actions will generate among long-time, loyal customers,
particularly those who will not understand why they must endure the personal cost of
defending groundless, but noncovered claims. Yet the possibility of reimbursement actions
in the personal lines cannot be ignored. See, e.g., Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Shierk,
996 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. II1. 1998) (awarding insurer reimbursement for defense of
noncovered claim under homeowners policy).
13.
There are several things, all of which are important, that this Article does not
do. First, it does not discuss, once the right is recognized, the amount of reimbursement to
which the insurer is entitled. Is the insurer entitled to reimbursement of all defense costs?
Or is the insurer only entitled to be reimbursed for costs incurred in defending claims for
which there was never a potential of coverage? Under the latter approach, a claim may, in
fact, be outside the coverage, but the insurer will be denied reimbursement if a potential for
coverage existed at the time the claim was filed. This issue will be the subject of a separate
article. Second, there is the matter of what procedures should be followed by the insurer
when reserving the right to reimbursement. Generally speaking, the insurer should be
explicit with the insured about its intentions to later seek reimbursement of defense costs as
part of any claim that the allegations against the insured are outside the coverage. Explicit
attention to the issue in the reservation of rights letter will moot any argument that the
insurer lacks such rights by virtue of its failure to notify the insured about its intention to
assert them. For more discussion of the practical steps to be followed in preserving the
reimbursement right, see Douglas R. Richmond, supra note 11, at 505-07, and Staff of
Theresa Flores & Associates, Litigation Management as a Tool for Meeting the Burden of
Proof Under Buss v. Superior Court, MEALEY'S INS. L. WKLY., Jan. 12, 1998, at 15, and

see generally Wall, supra note 11. Third, the insurer's assertion of the right to
reimbursement puts a number of ethical concerns in the lap of defense counsel. This may
create the need for additional disclosures by defense counsel at the time of the
representation, but there is no bar under the applicable ethical rules to an insurer seeking to
reserve unto itself the right to recover defense costs from the insured. For more discussion
of the ethical ramifications of the reimbursement issue, see Jack T. Bangert & Bradley M.
Dowd, Ethical Implicationsfor Defense Counsel When Insurers Seek Reimbursement, 65

DEF. CouNs. J. 502 (1998); Kathleen E. Hegen & Randy W. Kuluva, What Ethical and
Business Considerations Do Attorneys Face in Their Billing Practices? (Jan. 29, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, presented to the ABA Tort and Insurance Practice Section
Insurance Coverage Litigation Committees). For a general discussion of the need for
disclosure by defense counsel to the insured when the attorney is retained by the insurer to
represent the insured, see William T. Barker, InsuranceDefense Ethics and the Liability

Insurance Bargain, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 75, 88-92 (1997); Robert H. Jerry, II, Consent,
Contract, and the Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Counsel, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 153,

186-94 (1997).
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reimbursement: under the law of restitution, the insurer who defends a noncovered
claim bestows a benefit on the policyholder which, in justice, ought to be returned.
This Part concludes that a reasoned argument can be made in support of the
foregoing rationale, but that a reasoned argument can also be made to the contrary.
Because the doctrinal principles of restitution are malleable and the implications of
these principles are uncertain in application, restitution does not, by itself, provide
a predictable basis for deciding whether the insurer has a reimbursement right for
costs incurred in defending noncovered claims. Part III offers an alternative
justification; it explains that the insurer's right should be analyzed in terms of
contract law rules pertaining to interim settlements of unliquidated, disputed
claims. These principles lead to the conclusion that the insurer does have a
reimbursement right, assuming the insurer has taken proper steps to reserve it. The
upshot of this conclusion is that courts that have grounded the reimbursement right
in restitution principles have reached the correct result, but for tenuous reasons. In
Part IV, this Article concludes by briefly addressing a different, but pivotal,
question: whether, apart from the issue of the right being grounded in sound legal
principles, the existence of such a right is desirable. This Part concludes that
whenever insurers can reduce claims costs by pursuing the reimbursement right,
their efforts should be encouraged, as this produces a liability insurance product
most insureds desire ex ante.

I. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
As between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify, the more
expansive duty is the duty to defend. 4 The essence of this common assertion is
that the insurer is contractually obligated to defend even meritless suits that fall
within the policy's coverage. Meritless claims, presumably, will be defeated,
which means that the insurer's duty to indemnify such claims never will arise. In
that sense, then, the duty to defend is broader; it is triggered in more situations
than the duty to indemnify.
Yet in another sense, the common assertion that the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify is misleading. Whatever the differences
between the duties, the fact remains that both are directly linked to coverage. This
is obvious with respect to the duty to indemnify; the insured need only pay
judgments or settlements if the insured's liability arises out of a covered claim.
Similarly, the insurer's contractual undertaking is to defend the insured against
claims, even ones that are groundless or meritless, ifthe claims are within the
scope of the policy's coverage.' 5 With respect to any liability insurance product,
See JERRY, supra note 1, § IlI[a), at 729-30.
14.
As a matter of contract, nothing short of the public policy considerations
15.
which render certain kinds of coverages invalid (e.g., no insurance for nonfortuitous losses,
for criminal wrongdoing, etc.) prohibits an insurer from agreeing to defend any claim
brought against an insured. This is not, however, what insurers agree to do in the liability
forms commonly used today. In the "Homeowners Composite Form," the insurer promises
to defend "[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against an 'insured' for damages because
of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' to which this coverage

18
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the insurer defends more claims than it indemnifies; after all, some plaintiffs who
sue insureds will lose, and it necessarily follows that insurers will provide
indemnification less frequently than they provide defenses. This, however, does
not mean that the policy's coverage is broader with respect to the insurer's defense
obligation, as compared to the insurer's indemnity obligation. The default
principle is that an insurer need not defend-let alone indemnify-a claim against
its insured that falls outside the policy's coverage.
Examining the conditional nature of the defense and indemnity
obligations illuminates the differences between them. Whenever a contract is
formed, a set of reciprocal rights and duties is created immediately.' 6 The
performance of these duties, however, is not always immediately due and owing
because contracting parties commonly place conditions on performance
obligations. 7 Sometimes conditions define the timing of the duty's performance; 8
applies...." Homeowners Composite Form, HO 00 03 04 91 (1990), reprinted in

SUSAN

MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, I MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED

J.

199

(4th ed. 1997) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MILLER & LEFEBVRE]. In the standard

commercial form, the insurer promises to defend and indemnify with respect to "'bodily
injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies...." Commercial General
Liability (Occurrence) Form, CG 00 01 10 93 (1992), reprintedin I MILLER & LEFEBVRE, at
409 (emphasis added). For other examples, see Jerry, supra note 13, app. at 199-203.
16.
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

1 (1981). In Hohfeldian terms, the promisee's

remedy exists when the promisee has a right to assert it, and this right is the corollary of the
promisor's duty to perform; likewise, if the promisor has a duty to perform, some person
has a right to enforce that performance. As explained by Professor Corbin, the most
"convenient" definition of contract is "the legal relations between persons arising from a
voluntary expression of intention, and including at least one primary right in personam,
actual or potential, with its corresponding duty." Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance,
and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 170 (1917). The right-duty
correlation does not change when a contract is formed without an agreement or bargain, as
is the case with contracts formed under reliance principles. In such circumstances, the
promisee's (or in some instances a third party's) foreseeable change of position in reliance
on a promise gives rise to the promisor's duty which the promisee, in turn, has a right to
enforce. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS, §§

17(2), 90 (1981).

17.
"An obligor [under a contract] will often qualify his duty by providing that
performance will not become due unless a stated event, which is not certain to occur, does
occur. Such an event is called a condition. An obligor may make an event a condition of his
duty in order to shift to the obligee the risk of its non-occurrence.... An obligor may also
make an event a condition of his duty in order to induce the obligee to cause the event to
occur." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 9, topic 5, Introductory Note, (198 1).
18.
Because "[p]erformance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due
unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981), conditions are deployed to determine when a duty must be
performed. To take a common example, if a seller promises to pay a broker a commission
upon the closing of title pursuant to a land sales contract the broker has arranged, the
satisfaction of the condition to the seller's duty to pay the commission-the occurrence of
the closing-determines the time at which the seller's duty to the broker must be
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at other times, a condition's satisfaction or nonsatisfaction will determine whether
the duty is ever performed. 9 The insurer's duty to defend, which comes into
existence immediately upon the formation of a contract between insurer and
insured, is conditioned on, inter alia, the filing of a suit against the insured
alleging claims within coverage.2" Similarly, the insurer's duty to indemnify comes
into existence immediately upon a contract's formation, but it is conditioned on
the existence of a judgment against the insured on, or a settlement of, a claim
within coverage. Thus, the contractual duties of defense and indemnity are
coextensive in the sense that the contours of both duties are defined by the
coverage provided in the contract, but the condition to the duty to defend will be
satisfied in more instances than the condition to the duty to indemnify. This means
that the duty to defend will become due and owing in more situations, but this
does not alter the essential underlying relationship between the insurer's defense
obligation and the existence of coverage.
Beyond the foregoing observations, much remains unclear. In large
measure, this is because the typical liability insurance policy's language
concerning the duty to defend is indefinite. The general point was made by
performed. See, e.g., Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015, 1018
(Ind. 1998) (concluding that settlement agreement was not enforceable because condition
precedent of getting state's approval was not satisfied); Yeo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 555
N.W.2d 893, 895-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that submission to examination under
oath is condition to right of insured under property policy to bring suit against insurer upon
the policy; suit cannot proceed until condition is satisfied).
To carry forward the illustration in the preceding note, the failure of the
19.
buyer, without any fault or cause by the seller, to proceed with the closing results in the
non-occurrence of the condition-the closing-to the seller's duty to pay the commission
to the broker. In that situation, the seller's duty to pay the commission will never become
due and owing and will be discharged when it is clear that the condition cannot occur. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(2) (1981). See, e.g., Luttinger v. Rosen, 316
A.2d 757, 758 (Conn. 1972) (finding that buyer's duty to purchase premises was
discharged when condition that buyer obtain financing on particular terms was not met);
Irving v. Town of Clinton, 711 A.2d 141, 142 (Me. 1998) (stating that nonoccurrence of
condition, under snow plowing contract made contingent on approval of voters at annual
town meeting, discharged parties from their duties under contract); NGA #2 Ltd. Liab. Co.
v. Rains, 946 P.2d 163, 168 (Nev. 1997) (stating that vendor's duty to convey property was
discharged when vendee failed to record parcel map by end of grace period for closing of
escrow, where purchase agreement specified that time was of the essence).
Typically, duties are limited in scope. Indeed, the insurer under a policy
20.
covering liability for bodily injury and property damage losses does not undertake, at the
time of contracting, to provide anything to the insured for liabilities arising out of, for
example, the insured's nonperformance of contractual obligations to sell goods to third
parties. For breach of contract claims (and many others), the insurer assumes no duties at
all. But with respect to bodily injury and property damage losses, the insurer at the time of
contracting incurs presently existing duties, albeit ones that are conditioned on the
occurrence of some kind of accident that produces such losses. Thus, the insurer assumes a
duty to defend covered claims; this duty comes into existence when the contract between
insurer and insured is formed, but the performance of the duty is not due unless and until a
covered claim is filed against the insured.
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Professor Abraham over a decade ago, and it remains valid today: "Liability
insurance policies often create obligations that are insufficiently detailed to govern
insurer conduct completely. They appear to grant the insurer the privilege to settle
claims but impose no obligation to do so, and they create a duty to defend the
insurer without specifying its breadth or limits."2' Specifically, standardized
personal and commercial liability forms do not discuss the following: whether the
duty to defend is triggered when the insurer's coverage responsibility is
uncertain; 22 to what extent the insurer must defend when covered claims are
asserted in a complaint along with noncovered claims (and whether the answer
changes if the claims are inextricably connected to a common fact pattern);23 to
what extent the insurer enjoys a right to control the defense;' precisely who is the
client of defense counsel appointed by the insurer to defend the insured, and to
whom counsel owes his or her loyalties when interests diverge (or appear to have a
potential for divergence);' whether the duty to defend runs through appeals;26 how
conflicts are resolved when the insurer and insured disagree about strategies to be
employed in defending the claim against the insured; 27 to what extent the insurer
must act, if at all, to protect noncovered interests of the insured (such as the
insured's reputation interests); 2 and more. There is considerable case law, much
of which is lacking in consistency, purporting to answer each of these questions,
but the fundamental point is that policy language in the insurance contract does
not resolve these questions.

21.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 203 (1986).
22.
See id. at 196 (noting that the "language of the standard liability policy
provides almost no guidance" with respect to the insurer's duty when coverage is in doubt).
23.
The general rule is that the insurer has a duty to defend all claims in a mixed
action, but this answer is not required by the text of liability insurance forms in widespread
use today. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 775 (Cal. 1997) (explaining that the
text of the insurance contract does not support the obligation to defend mixed actions in
their entirety; rather, the court "can, and doles], justify the insurer's duty to defend the
entire 'mixed' action prophylactically, as an obligation imposed by law in support of the
policy"); JERRY, supra note 1, § 111[c][4], at 737-40; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 9.03[c], at 9-66 to -69 (2d ed. 1999).
24.
See Jerry, supra note 13, at 163, 174-86; Charles Silver & Kent Syverud,
The ProfessionalResponsibilitiesofInsuranceDefense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 264-65
(1995).
25.
For more discussion, see I ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES (3d ed. 1995), § 4.19, at 215-18, William T. Barker, The TripartiteRelationship:
Who Is the Client and To Whom Does the Attorney Owe Ethical Duties?, 20 INS. L1TIG.
RPTR. 729 (1998), and Symposium, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional
Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997).

26.

For more discussion, see JERRY, supra note 1,§ 113, at 776-79 and I

WINDT, supra note 25, § 4.17, at 213-14.
27.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § 114[d][2], at 809-14; 1 WINDT, supra note 25,

§ 4.20, at 218-26.
28.
See Western Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78
(Ct. App. 1995); Jerry, supra note 13, at 159 n.26.
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The same must be said with respect to the insurer's alleged right to
reimbursement of defense costs for defending noncovered claims. Standardized
liability forms speak neither for nor against such a right. Given the indefinite
nature of the forms, this should come as no surprise. Indeed, because no text in the
forms explains how or why an insurer might find itself defending noncovered
claims in the first place, it should be anticipated that the insurer's right to be
compensated for doing something beyond its contractual obligation receives no
mention.
This discussion does not attempt to make perfect order out of the often
perplexing array of judicial decisions regarding the scope of the duty to defend.29
The crucial point to recognize for present purposes is that the insurer's
reimbursement right, if it exists, rides "piggy back" on the duty to defend. That is,
to the extent the insurance contract or insurance law doctrines" impose a duty on
the insurer to provide a defense, the insurer, by necessity, has no right to
reimbursement of defense costs; one cannot be reimbursed for doing something
which is a part of one's obligation. Likewise, to the extent the insurer provides a
defense in circumstances where none was owed, the insurer might have a right to
reimbursement of defense costs. Because the duty to defend is linked to coverage,
it follows that an insurer never can have a right to reimbursement of defense costs
incurred in defending covered claims, but the insurer might have such a right with
respect to the defense of noncovered claims in some circumstances.
The "piggy back" relationship between the duty to defend and the
insurer's reimbursement right suggests a further point. To the extent the cases
addressing whether and to what extent an insurer has a reimbursement right are
inconsistent, the dissonance can sometimes be attributed not to disagreement over
the reimbursement right per se, but to different approaches regarding the scope of
the duty to defend.3' Indeed, in situations where the insurer has defended the
insured under a reservation of rights and now contests coverage for the sole
purpose of clarifying the absence of an indemnity obligation, the scope of the
insurer's defense obligation is irrelevant. Whether a defense obligation existed or
not, the insurer defended; if the presence or absence of an indemnity is the only
remaining issue, it does not matter whether the duty to defend never existed (i.e.,
was nonexistent ab initio) or whether a duty to defend existed at the moment the
plaintiffs complaint in the underlying action was tendered but subsequently
This is, to be sure, difficult territory. For other treatments, see generally
1, § 111, at 729-763, STEMPEL, supra note 23, § 9.03, at 9-54 to -83,
25, §§ 4.01-4.45, at 145-293, and Richmond, supra note 11, at 459-72.
Any treatment of the amount of reimbursement to which an insurer is entitled, see supra
note 13, as distinguished from whether such a right exists, must examine the boundaries of
the duty to defend in more detail.
30.
Established principles of insurance law impose upon the insurer a duty to
defend some claims even though the literal terms of the contract impose no such duty. See
infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
The differences between the eight-corners rule and the potentiality rule are
31.
described infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
29.

JERRY, supra note
WINDT, supra note
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ceased to exist (e.g., was extinguished at the moment the court declared no
coverage existed or the moment all potentially covered claims in the underlying
action were dismissed). But to the insurer seeking reimbursement of defense costs,
these finer points regarding the duty to defend matter greatly. If the insurer never
had a duty to defend, the insurer reasonably can make a claim for reimbursement
of all defense costs. If a duty to defend once existed but later was terminated, the
insurer's recovery will be limited to costs incurred after the moment of
termination-and if the insurer withdraws from the defense when the duty ceases
to exist, the upshot will be that the insurer receives no reimbursement of costs
incurred. 2
The extent of the insurer's defense obligation has been addressed by
judicial decision in every state,33 and the results tend to organize themselves
around two different rules. Many jurisdictions follow the so-called "eight-comers"
rule (or "four-comers" rule, depending on who does the counting 34), pursuant to
which the allegations of the four comers of the complaint are compared to the
terms (or "four more" comers) of the policy, and only if the allegations are within
the policy's coverage does the insurer owe a defense. 35 No defense is owed for
allegations outside coverage, and the insurer need not look beyond the four

32.
Determining how much reimbursement an insurer should receive, assuming
a right to reimbursement exists, necessarily depends on determining the precise times
during which the insurer defended even though it had no obligation to do so. A rmore
detailed treatment of this question will be provided in a forthcoming article. See supra note
13.
33.

See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE

COVERAGEDISPUrES § 5.02[a][C], at 176-99 (9th ed. 1998).
34.
See EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 898 F. Supp. 952, 961 (D. Conn. 1995)
(applying "four comers" rule); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines,
Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997) (adhering to "eight comers" rule); Smith v. Katz,
595 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Wis. 1999) (adhering to "four comers" rule).
35.
Some commentators and scholars describe this rule as the majority rule. See
Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REv. 1, 23
(1999) ("almost universally-used approach is the eight-comers rule"); Richmond, supra
note II, at 460 (eight-comers rule is "majority rule"). How one counts the cases depends on
how one interprets them. In many cases, courts do not need to choose between the eightcomers rule and its primary competitor (the "potentiality rule") because both rules produce
the same result. In such circumstances, one should be cautious about how one reads a
judicial pronouncement that the allegations of the complaint are controlling, if the court is
even that clear about the approach it is following in a particular case. Moreover, even if the
potentiality rule is a minority rule, it has a substantial following-so substantial that it may,
in fact, be the majority rule. See EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., I INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION § 3.3, at 118-19 (1997) ("Only a minority of courts have held that the court
must confine its inquiry to facts alleged within the four comers of the complaint."); Pryor,
supra, at 23 n.87 ("Most jurisdictions recognize a significant caveat to the complaint
allegation rule. If the pleadings do not allege a potentially covered claim, but the insurer has
knowledge of extrinsic facts that indicate a reasonable possibility of coverage, then the
insurer has a duty to defend.").
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comers of the allegations of the complaint when determining its defense

obligation.36

The other approach is the so-called "potentiality rule," pursuant to which
an insurer owes a duty37to defend whenever a complaint is filed that raises a
"potential for coverage." The essence of the rule is that an insurer cannot ignore
actual facts of which it is aware when evaluating whether it is obligated to defend
the insured.38 Instead, it "must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and must
consider any facts brought to its attention or any facts which it could reasonably
discover in determining whether it has a duty to defend."39 If the known or
reasonably discoverable facts "give rise to a 'potential of liability,' even if remote,
under the policy," the insurer must defend.4"
Notwithstanding the significant differences between the eight-comers
rule and the potentiality rule, under either rule it is possible that an insurer might
be obligated to commence a defense, even though it eventually will become
apparent with the benefit of subsequently acquired information about the actual
See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Clifford, 366 N.W.2d 489, 491 (S.D.
36.
1985) ("If it is clear or arguably appears from the face of the pleadings in the action against
the insured that the alleged claim, if true, falls within policy coverage, the insurer must
defend. The review then ends...."); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819,
821-22 (Tex. 1997) (stating that if the complaint does not allege facts within coverage, the
insurer need not defend); General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718, 722-23
(Wis. 1997) (stating that insurer's defense obligation is predicated solely on allegations in
the underlying action). For other citations to representative authority, see OSTRAGER &
NEWMAN, supra note 33, § 5.02[a], at 161-71.
See, e.g., Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994)
37.
(requiring insurer to defend when insurer's duty to defend is not apparent from the
pleadings but the allegations state a claim potentially or arguably covered); First Bank of
Turley v. Fidelity & Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 928 P.2d 298, 302-04 (Okla. 1996) (stating
that duty to defend is determined by underlying complaint and other pleadings and from
other sources available to the insurer at the time the defense is tendered); State Bankcorp,
Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 S.E.2d 228, 233, 239 n.12 (W. Va. 1997)
(stating that when in doubt, insurer must look beyond allegations of complaint and conduct
an inquiry into facts to determine whether claims may be within coverage). For other
citations to representative authority, see OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supra note 33, § 5.02[a], at
171-91, and I WINDT, supra note 25, § 4.03, at 169-72.
See, e.g., Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53, 56-59 (Ga.
38.
1962) (requiring insurer to consider extrinsic facts in determining whether duty to defend
exists); Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 545 N.E.2d 1156,
1158-61 (Mass. 1989) (mandating that insurer give consideration to facts outside the
complaint when it considers the allegations in the complaint to determine if coverage
exists); E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 726 P.2d 439, 443-44
(Wash. 1986) ("An insurance company is required to look beyond the allegations of the
complaint if.. .the allegations are in conflict with facts known or readily ascertainable by
insurer....").

Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 865 P.2d 182, 188 (Kan. 1993).
39.
Steinle v. Knowles, 961 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Kan. 1998) (quoting MGM, Inc.
40.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 79 (Kan. 1993)).
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facts, that no possibility existed at the time the complaint was filed that a claim
within coverage would ever be proved. Moreover, information asymmetries alone
may force the insurer to provide a defense, simply because it is unable to
determine at the time the defense is tendered whether coverage exists. 4' Because it
is inherent in both rules that insurers will defend some claims, or even entire suits,
where coverage does not in fact exist, insurers should (at least in theory) charge
and collect enough premiums to cover the costs associated with defending claims
for which there is only "potential coverage" or with respect to which the eightcomers rule requires a defense even though no possibility of recovery exists under
the actual facts. But the fact that insurers might collect premiums to fund the
defenses of noncovered claims does not alter this basic point: When a defense is
provided because coverage appeared possible but hindsight shows it never existed,
or because in an eight-comers jurisdiction a noncovered claim is disguised in the
pleadings as a covered claim, the insured receives a defense for a noncovered
claim-even though the duty to defend is, like the duty to indemnify, directly
linked to coverage.
Viewed from the perspective of the other policyholders who subsidize the
receipt of defenses by some insureds for noncovered claims, the result is
problematic. The appropriate question to ask is whether insureds (assuming they
possess full information, i.e., full understanding of alternative products and their
costs) would be interested in purchasing, and insurers would be interested in
providing, liability insurance for defense of some noncovered claims. It seems fair
to initially posit the following: (a) insureds expect to receive a defense to covered
claims, including groundless or meritless claims within coverage; (b) insureds do
not expect, ex ante, to receive defenses to noncovered claims;42 and (c) insureds do
41.
See Richmond, supra note 11, at 466 ("An insurer's duty to defend
is.. .determined at the outset of the litigation, when coverage issues may be unclear, or
when coverage questions are unanswered.").
42.
Expectation is, of course, different from desire. Insureds may desire such
coverage exposte, but this does not mean that they expected it ex ante. For example, when
sued for loss-of-bargain damages in a contract action, an insured may wish that her liability
insurer defend her, but the insured did not expect such coverage ex ante when purchasing
protection for bodily injury and property damage liabilities.
The observation that insureds do not expect defenses to noncovered claims should not
be understood to mean that insurance policies could not be drafted to create broader
coverage with respect to defense than with respect to indemnity. For example, insureds
might demand, and insurers might be willing to provide, insurance which does not
indemnify insureds for judgments arising out of certain kinds of conduct (e.g., libel,
slander, sexual harassment, some intentional torts), but which does provide a defense in the
event the insured is sued for those kinds of conduct. In that event, the insured expects to be
defended for claims that are outside the insurer's indemnity obligation; but in such
instances, the claims are within the coverage under the defense obligation. Indeed, as Ellen
Smith Pryor observes, such policies might be desirable (or "efficient" in the economic
sense); the insured receives litigation insurance for frivolous claims of intentional conduct,
but the insurer does not have to pay proceeds in the event such claims are ultimately proved
valid. See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for
InsuranceFunding,75 TEx. L. REv. 1721, 1729-30, 1746-60 (1997). Of course, under this
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not expect to pay a premium to subsidize the receipt by other insureds of defenses
to noncovered claims.4" In the absence of empirical testing of the foregoing three
points, the assertion that some insureds expect defenses of some noncovered
claims cannot be disproved. Yet, under conditions of perfect competition,
complete information among all market participants, and the absence of costs
associated with product differentiation (because consumer understanding of
alternative products would be perfect), it is fair to posit that if insurers announced
they were collecting premiums from all insureds to enable the provision of
defenses to some noncovered claims at the insurers' expense, some insureds would
request the opportunity to purchase a more limited and less expensive coverage,
where there is absolutely no entitlement to a defense for noncovered claims.
Insureds that prefer the more limited coverage would, presumably, recognize that
courts in some instances may require insurers to defend some noncovered claims,
but these insureds likely would desire that insurers defending such claims obtain
reimbursement of the costs of defense from those insureds after a court has
determined that the claim was, in fact, outside the coverage.
Whatever products might be offered in perfectly efficient markets, and
whatever choices insurance consumers would make in those markets, the fact
remains that an insurer who successfully and cost-effectively recoups sums
expended in defending noncovered claims reduces total claims costs. To the extent
policyholders prefer not to provide cross-subsidies to insureds who are sued on
noncovered claims, and to the extent policyholders prefer their premiums to be
lower, reimbursement of defense costs should be favored by policyholders."
kind of insurance, some blameless insureds would end up subsidizing the defense costs of
blameworthy insureds, but in some markets (e.g., a pool of similarly sized and situated
business firms), individual market participants may be willing to bear the expense of
subsidizing some bad actors to obtain the protection afforded by this kind of coverage.
This proposition follows from the preceding one. If an insured does not
43.
expect ex ante to receive a defense to a noncovered claim, the insured would neither expect
nor desire to pay for the bestowal of this benefit to other similarly situated policyholders.
Until a robust reimbursement right is recognized, it is difficult to know
44.
whether insurers would, in fact, use accrued savings to offer a less expensive insurance
product. Under conditions of sufficient competition, insurers that routinely defend
noncovered claims without seeking reimbursement would have higher expenses, and
therefore a more expensive insurance product; these insurers would, presumably, lose
market share to insurers that develop a less expensive product. In the absence of
competitive pressures, however, the effect of the availability of reimbursement on product
price could be slight or nonexistent. In such an environment, one might anticipate that
insurers would limit the pursuit of reimbursement to the unusual case where defense costs
are very high, i.e., complex litigation, and the number of covered claims relative to
noncovered claims is very low. Insurers would also decide whether to seek reimbursement
based on considerations such as whether the insured still does business with the insurer (if
the insured now purchases coverage from a competitor, the case is stronger for pursuing
reimbursement) or whether the insured is thought be a loyal customer whose prospect of
continuing to pay premiums is high (the insurer is less likely to pursue reimbursement). In
this environment, insurers would favor recognition of a reimbursement right simply to have
it as an option, which might be pursued or not pursued on a random, ad hoc basis. In the
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Indeed, one might speculate whether future iterations of the standard liability
insurance policies will explicitly authorize the insurer to seek reimbursement of
costs incurred in defending noncovered claims.4" Unless the reimbursement right is
provided by explicit policy text or by judicial rule (and is then consistently
pursued by insurers), tension will exist between insureds that receive defenses for
noncovered claims and the remainder of insureds. Indeed, it is safe to say that no
individual policyholder who, when sued for noncovered claims, will voluntarilylet alone eagerly-embrace the opportunity to reimburse the insurer for the costs
of defense rendered in the policyholder's behalf.

I. RESTITUTION AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
INSURER'S RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
Those who support the right to reimbursement of costs incurred in
defending noncovered claims typically justify their position under the law of
restitution.46 Although restitution was the rationale for the holding in Buss47 and
absence of data, the argument cannot be resolved; in the absence of a recognized, reliable
right of reimbursement, the absence of data is difficult to overcome.
45.

In Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1987), where the

Ninth Circuit applied Hawaii law, the court spoke approvingly of the insurer's right to
reimbursement, but the case is distinguishable on the important ground that reimbursement
was specifically authorized by the directors and officers liability policy at issue. See id. at
279, 282. Yet Okada does stand for the proposition that such a right explicitly set forth in
the policy is valid and enforceable. This precedent will become more important if at some
point in the future standardized policies are redrafted to authorize insurers to seek
reimbursement for costs incurred in defending noncovered claims. In that event, the
liability insurance contract will provide the theoretical justification for the reimbursement
right, thus mooting the need for the analysis in this Article. See Richmond, supra note !1,
at 495 (explaining that courts should give "an insurer that employs manuscript policies
expressly conferring a right to reimbursement" such a right).
Why, then, have insurers not done this already in standardized policies? Several
reasons are possible. First, the duty to defend language in the insuring agreement in the
standardized forms has not undergone major structural change in recent decades.
Notwithstanding numerous issues and problems that arise under the current indefinite
language, see supra text accompanying notes 21-28, the form handles most cases without
difficulty. Insurers' reluctance to make major changes that inevitably will be accompanied
by uncertainty is understandable, particularly given the fact that such changes would affect
almost every claim made against an insured. Also, any textual change mentioning the
possibility of a defense being provided for noncovered claims must be worded, from the
insurer's perspective, with extraordinary specificity; otherwise, the insurer risks, for
example, a judicial interpretation extending the insurer's indemnity obligation to
noncovered claims under a contra proferentum rationale. See JERRY, supra note I,
§§ 25A[b]-[c], at 129-36 (discussing contra proferentum and other principles of contract
interpretation). If, however, insurers perceive substantial benefits to be gained from
reimbursement claims, one should expect that the foregoing risks will not deter changes in
standardized language clearly authorizing reimbursement.
46.
See Richmond, supra note 11, at 496-505; Barker, supra note 11, at 543-52.
47.
Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 776, 776-77 (Cal. 1997).
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was the focus of a few other decisions discussing the theoretical underpinnings of
the insurer's claimed reimbursement right 48 grounding the insurer's
reimbursement right-or the denial of the existence of such a right-in the law of

Under the policy, the insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured
as to the claims that are not even potentially covered. With regard to
defense costs for these claims, the insurer has not been paid premiums
by the insured. It did not bargain to bear these costs. To attempt to shift
them would not upset the arrangement. The insurer therefore has a right
of reimbursement that is implied in law as quasi-contractual, whether or
not it has one that is implied in fact in the policy as contractual. As
stated, under the law of restitution such a right runs against the person
who benefits from 'unjust enrichment' and in favor of the person who
suffers loss thereby. The 'enrichment' of the insured by the insurer
through the insurer's bearing of unbargained-for defense costs is
inconsistent with the insurer's freedom under the policy and therefore
must be deemed 'unjust.'
Id. (citations omitted).
48.
Most of the early cases discussing reimbursement, if they had an identifiable
rationale, reasoned that an insurer could not recover costs expended in defending
noncovered claims if it lacked an "understanding" with the insured or had not put the
insured on notice in the reservation of rights letter that such reimbursement would be
sought. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting that "the record does not reflect an understanding between the parties that
Ralee would reimburse St. Paul if St. Paul eventually decided not to defend"); North
Atlantic Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. William D., 743 F. Supp. 1361, 1366-67 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(stating that the "court can order the insured to reimburse the insurer only if there was an
'agreement or understanding' between the insured and insurer that there was a right to
reimbursement"); Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 784
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that insured's acceptance of defense is adequate to show
insured's "understanding" of insurer's right to reimbursement, even if insured objects to the
reservation of rights); Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502, 505
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that agreement or understanding is required and that insured's
silence while acquiescing in insurer's provision of defense pursuant to explicit reservation
is sufficient to enable insurer to recover defense costs), aff'd, 902 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1990);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Alan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69-70 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "the only
theory for recovery of defense costs would be an agreement or understanding between
[insured and insurer]"). Because the insurer could seek reimbursement only when, at a
minimum, the insured was notified in advance of the insurer's intentions, insurers in some
cases where the notice was obviously inadequate sought to establish a right to
reimbursement based on the law of restitution. At least initially, the courts rejected this
reasoning. See Reliance Ins. Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. at 69-70; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231
Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1986). Buss, as discussed below, sustained the restitution theory,
but in a factual context where not only notice but also an agreement contemplating the
possibility of reimbursement existed. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 770 (describing notice given to
insured and reimbursement agreement); id. at 784 n.27 (stating that insurer can reserve
reimbursement right unilaterally; insured's agreement is not necessary, although it existed
in the instant case anyway); infra text accompanying notes 83-105. For a survey of
California cases on reimbursement, see Richmond, supra note 11, at 473-80.
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restitution is problematic.49 The malleability of the law of restitution is both its
virtue and its curse. The malleability is virtuous in that it empowers courts to
exercise discretion to reach just results, but flexibility's price is unpredictability;
restitution's defined contours permit reasoned arguments both in favor of and in
opposition to the insurer's reimbursement right. Thus, when the existence of the
right is a question of first impression, as it will be in almost every jurisdiction in
the United States, predicting whether a particular court will recognize the right is
difficult. In probing restitution's limitations as the theoretical basis for the
reimbursement right, this Part documents the need for a less pliant resolution of
the question. In so doing, this discussion also introduces an alternative
justification, which is more fully developed in Part III.
A. The Generaland MalleablePrinciples of Restitution
Restitution is both a substantive theory and a remedy.50 It resides in the
interstices between tort and contract and it furthers both corrective5 and

49.
Because the doctrine of equitable subrogation, like restitution, serves justicepromoting purposes, it is predictable that subrogation might be considered as a possible
predicate for an insurer's reimbursement claim. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is
apparent that the doctrine cannot be used to support the insurer's reimbursement claim.
"Subrogation is an equitable right that enables one who is secondarily liable for a debt and
who pays it to succeed to the rights, if any, that the creditors hold against the debtor."
JERRY, supra note 1, § 96[a], at 600. Thus, in its most common insurance application, if the
insurer pays the insured's loss, the insurer is entitled to assert the insured's rights against
third parties that caused the insured's loss. The insured's incurring defense costs is not a
loss for which a third party is responsible, and by paying the defense costs, the insurer does
not pay a third party's debt owed the insured (e.g., the tortfeasor's debt to the insured). In
seeking reimbursement, the insurer asserts a claim against its own insured, which does not
and cannot happen under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. See id. § 96[f], at 612-13
(noting that subrogation by insurer against own insured not allowed).
50.
Even this starting point is controversial. Professor Andrew Kull forcefully
argues that restitution should be viewed as a substantive theory (with accompanying
remedy), and not a remedy that can be appended to contract claims or tort claims. See
Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1204-10 (1995)
[hereinafter Kull, Rationalizing]. See generally Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for
Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1465 (1994) [hereinafter Kull, Remedy for Breach].

That restitution is an independent substantive theory of recovery is beyond dispute, even if
the substantive theory is too often overlooked and under-emphasized. As long as the term
"restitution" is used to describe a remedy in the context of a contractual transaction, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 370-377 (1981), restitution will continue to be
understood as having a remedial dimension that operates in conjunction with other
substantive theories of recovery.
51.
"Corrective justice" refers to the kind of justice that "captures the
correlativity within a single transaction, of wrongful doing and suffering-and with it the
correlativity in private law of the defendant's duty to avoid inflicting such suffering and the
plaintiff's right to immunity from it." Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent RationalityofLaw, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 978 (1988).
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distributive justice.52 Fundamental notions of corrective justice suggest that a party
upon whom excess benefits are nongratuitously bestowed ought, in fairness, to
return them to the conferring party. 3 This principle has many beneficial
applications in our society. It helps explain, for example, why a thief must return
goods taken from a victim,54 why one party to an unenforceable contract must
52.
See Weinrib, supra note 51, at 988-92 (explaining that distributive justice
occurs in distributions, whereas corrective justice occurs in transactions). "In distributive
justice, things are allocated to persons in accordance with a criterion of distribution. The
criterion will be chosen in the light of, and will be applied to promote, the purpose that a
given distribution is intended to realize." Peter Benson, The Basis of CorrectiveJustice and
Its Relation to DistributiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 515, 535 (1992). "In corrective justice
the holdings of the parties immediately prior to their interaction 'provides the baseline from
which the gain and the loss' are calculated. In distributive justice, the baseline is set by a
completely separate criterion, generally based on some notion of worth." Jeffrey O'Connell
& Christopher J. Robinette, "Choice Auto Insurance": Do Theories of Justice Require
Linkage Between Injurers and the Injured?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 1109, 1128 (footnote

omitted).
53.
"[Cjorrective or compensatory justice is concerned with the category of
wrongful gains and losses. Rectification.. .is a matter of justice when it is necessary to
protect a distribution of holdings (or entitlements) from distortions which arise from unjust
enrichments and wrongful losses. The principle of corrective justice requires the
annulments of both wrongful gains and losses." JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS,
AND THE LAW 185 (1988). "Restitution concerns itself primarily with wrongful gains." Jules
L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 427, 444

(1992).
54.
See I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 554 (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing remedy for victim of theft of watch); I GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 3 (1978) (explaining restitutionary remedy for benefit received by
thief). Of course, other theories could be used to explain the remedy the victim's loss,
including an action for damages in tort. A recent draft of a proposed Restatement (Third) of
Restitution would place the restoration remedy for theft outside the scope of this body of
law. For more information on the proposed Restatement (Third) of Restitution, see infra

note 72. "Liability in restitution is imposed in response to a transfer that lacks an adequate
legal basis," and such transfers fall within three broad categories: transfers void or voidable
at the election of the transferor; transfers where the plaintiff intentionally confers a benefit
on the defendant not intending to make a gift; and transactions in which a benefit is
obtained by wrongdoing. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. d (Council Draft
No. 1, 1999). Through explicit articulation of what is "unjustified enrichment" calling for
liability in restitution, the structure of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Restitution
excludes "many other legal relations in which an owner's entitlement to the restoration of
property might theoretically be explained in terms of the defendant's unjust enrichment but
which, by convention, are not so classified." Id. § I cmt. c. Because the unjust enrichment
accompanying a theft can be remedied under tort law, the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Restitution does not include such a claim under the law of restitution. "It would serve no
useful purpose to elaborate a redundant, enrichment-based explanation of the owner's right
to recovery of property from a thief, or of a contracting party's right to recover a
prepayment upon the other party's repudiation, simply because the legal relations in
question already receive a full account in tort or contract, as the case may be." Id. The
intention of this structuring of the law of restitution is to give it not only precision but also
an identity separate from other substantive bodies of law, such as tort and contract.
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return the benefits of the receipt of the other side's part performance to the other,5"
and why a party who has received a benefit by virtue of the conferring party's
mistake ought to return it.56 Traditionally, the justification for these solutions lies
in the recognition that one party has received an "enrichment" that, if retained,
would result in an injustice, i.e., "unjust enrichment."57 Restitution also promotes
distributive justice, although less aggressively than corrective justice. In some
contexts, restitution creates wealth-maximizing exchanges in circumstances where

"[R]estitution (meaning the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment) is itself a source of
obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract." Id. § I cmt. h.
55.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Slaughter, 541 F.2d 254, 256 (10th Cir. 1976)
(allowing plaintiff restitution for loss suffered upon defendant's nonperformance of an oral
contract deemed unenforceable under the statute of frauds); Montanaro Bros. Builders, Inc.
v. Snow, 460 A.2d 1297, 1301 (Conn. 1983) (stating that vendor on land sale contract must
return payments received where contract is unenforceable under statute of frauds).
56.
See, e.g., Bridges v. Cal-Pacific Leasing Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (Ct.
App. 1971) (concluding that payor for leased restaurant equipment is entitled to restitution
for payments made to one mistakenly believed to own the equipment); Sunwest Bank of
Albuquerque, N.A. v. Colucci, 872 P.2d 346, 349-50 (N.M. 1994) (stating that bank is
entitled to recover sum mistakenly paid to beneficiary whose interest was payable only
upon death of both joint tenants).
57.
See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935) (stating that
the test for recovery in restitution is whether a benefit "was received in such circumstances
that the possessor will give offense to equity and good conscience if permitted to retain it").
The restitution framework championed by Professor Kull puts all enrichments related to
contractual transactions outside the scope of restitution. He contends that restitution is, in
fact, based on the principle of unjust enrichment, and urges that restitution has no relevance
to legal disputes arising out of enforceable contracts. See Kull, Rationalizing,supra note
50, at 1196-97. This framework is the scheme of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Restitution, for which Professor Kull is the reporter. See sources cited supra note 54 and
accompanying text. The anchor of contract remedies is, of course, protecting expectation,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981), but contract law contemplates
that aggrieved plaintiffs are, subject to the usual limiting rules (such as certainty and
foreseeability) allowed to opt down to the lesser remedies of reliance or restitution if they
choose. Thus, in contract law, restitution may be an appropriate remedy for breach of
contract or failure of contract, but in noncontractual settings, restitution is an independent,
substantive theory upon which one person's liability to another is predicated. See I DOBBS,
supra note 54, at 552 ("Restitution is often an appropriate remedy for breach of an
enforceable contract, whether or not there is a 'rescission' of that contract."); I PALMER,
supra note 54, § 4.1, at 366 ("[T]he central fact is that, in the circumstances discussed in
this chapter, restitution, when available, is a remedy for the defendant's breach of
contract."). For a critique of such a postulation of restitution, see Kull, Rationalizing,supra
note 50, at 1222-26 (arguing that describing restitution as a "remedial alternative" is
undesirable; "a unitary definition of restitution is preferable to a complex one"), and see
generally Kull, Remedy for Breach, supra note 50. If Professor Kull's analytical framework
defines the boundaries of the substantive law of restitution, it undercuts the insurer's
argument for reimbursement of defense costs, given that the insurer makes its claim in the
context of an enforceable contract. See Quinn, supra note 11, at 605.
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prohibitive transaction costs preclude bargaining." This illuminates restitution's
situs relative to the boundary of contract law; the principles of the law of
restitution deny recovery to those who officiously confer benefits in circumstances
where it was feasible to go to the market and negotiate an exchange with the
beneficiaries of their gratuity.59 Thus, it might be said that when bargains are
feasible, restitution defers to contract law's scheme of distributive justice. This
suggests that distributive justice is not the goal which restitution most consistently
or fervently serves' and that corrective justice is restitution's most salient feature.
In each of the examples noted above-theft, unenforceable contract; and
mistake-as well as most others that might be identified, the enrichment is
received as a direct consequence of a loss by some other party. The persistent
pairing of benefit with loss or invasion of an interest suggests, as Professor
Laycock has explained,61 that restitution has a restorative function that
58.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 133-34 (4th ed.
1992); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. Rav. 65, 67 (1985)

("[R]estitution... present[s] the question of whether to create bargains where the parties
have not done so."). But see I DOBBS, supra note 54, at 558 ("[U]njust enrichment refers to
corrective justice, not distributive justice. It does not invite judgments about the fair
distribution of wealth in society.").
59.

See Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class

Actions, 76 CORNELL L. Rav. 656, 667 (1991) ("Restitution thus frowns on providers who
attempt to substitute courts for markets."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
§ 2 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 1, 1999).
[T]he characteristic feature of those transactions that give rise to a
liability in restitution.. .is that a benefit has been conferred.. .outside the
consensual framework that would ordinarily govern the transaction in
question. Broadly speaking, it is the absence of a bargain between the
parties that explains why such a benefit constitutes unjustified
enrichment in the hands of the recipient.
Id.

Even granting that the boundary between restitution and contract deserves explicit
demarcation, it does not follow that restitution has no relevance to every relationship
between parties grounded in contract, and Professor Kull's framework should not be so
understood. If a party over-performs a contract by mistake and thereby confers a benefit on
the other party, the remedy for the unjust enrichment lies in restitution rather than contract.
Professor Palmer grouped the over-performance cases together under the heading of
"mistake in performance." See III PALMER, supra note 54, §§ 14.1-.28. Restitution for
mistaken over-performance of a contract duty also receives implicit approval in the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Restitution. See RSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I
illus. 6 (Council Draft No. 1, 1999) (describing the following: A overpays a debt owed B;
no contract between A and B establishes a duty to refund the over-payment; B's "obligation
to refund the overpayment is a liability in restitution"; assume A's prior debt is created by
contract). The problem of mistaken over-performance is given further attention below. See
infra text accompanying note 161.
60.
See Silver, supra note 59, at 668.
61.
See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance ofRestitution, 67 TEX. L.
REv. 1277, 1279 (1989). But see Kull, Rationalizing,supra note 50, at 1194, 1215-19
(discussing and critiquing Laycock's position).
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accompanies the function of preventing the retention of an undeserved gain. This
conceptualization of restitution gives it a dual focus, with neither dimension
subsuming the other. Preventing unjust enrichment emphasizes the defendant's
gain, while restoration focuses on the plaintiff's loss.62 In contrast to the dualdimension construction is a framework urged by Professor Wonnell, who argues
that "[a] unitary principle of liability based upon unjust enrichment is not coherent
or normatively plausible and should be abandoned."63 He proposes restating the
law of restitution in terms of four discrete principles, each of which reinforces the
contention that most restitution cases "are ultimately grounded in harm-based
rather than benefit-based remedial theories."" '
The traditional understanding of restitution, however, does not look at the
conferring party's loss and instead focuses on the recipient's benefit.65 An
enrichment-oriented doctrine is sufficient to generate just results when one party is
benefitted through theft or the mistaken conferral of a benefit." The same benefitoriented reasoning operates when restitution is awarded to an aggrieved party as
the remedy for breach of contract,67 and the logic is apparent in those cases in
noncontractual settings where plaintiffs seeking restitution have been awarded
more than they lost.6" The traditional understanding also resonates in the
Restatement of Restitution promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1937,69
62.
This distinction, Professor Laycock argues, explains the more powerful
remedies awarded to plaintiffs who can trace specific property that has found its way into a
defendant's hands. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 1280. For a rejoinder, see Kull,
Rationalizing,supra note 50, at 1216-19.
63.
Christopher T. Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust
Enrichment,45 EMORY L.J. 153, 219 (1996).
64.
Id. at 155.
65.
See I DOBBS, supra note 54, at 552 (stating that restitution's "purpose is to
prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment by recapturing the gains the defendant secured in
a transaction"); DOUGLAS G. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 524 (2d ed. 1994)
("The most distinctive feature of restitution is that liability is based on, and recovery is
usually limited by, benefit to defendant rather than harm to plaintiff."); Kull, Rationalizing,
supra note 50, at 1193 (1995) ("The modem consensus puts unjust enrichment at the heart
of liability in restitution...."). Comment b of section 1 to the proposed Restatement (Third)
of Restitution quotes Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (1761),
where Lord Mansfield stated: "In one word, the gist of this kind of action [referring to
quasi-contract] is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the
ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION§ I cmt. b (Council Draft No. 1, 1999)
66.
See supra notes 54, 56.
67.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981) ("A party is
entitled to restitution under the rules stated in this Restatement only to the extent that he has
conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.").
68.
See, e.g., Edward's v. Lee's Admin., 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936); Qlwell v.
Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
69.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). Comment a to section Istates: "A
person is enriched if he has received a benefit.... A person is unjustly enriched if the
retention of the benefit would be unjust.... A person obtains restitution when he is restored
to the position he formerly occupied either by the returning of something which he formerly
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in the first section of the Tentative Draft of the ill-fated Restatement (Second) of
Restitution,0 in the text of Professor Palmer's preeminent treatise,7'"and in the first
section of the November 1999 Council Draft of the proposed Restatement (Third)
ofRestitution.2
Yet, even under the traditional understanding of restitution that focuses
on retrieving benefits conferred and relieving unjust enrichments, the relationship
between benefit and loss in the law of restitution is hardly tidy. To illustrate this
murkiness, consider the foundational first section in the 1937 Restatement of
Restitution: "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another
must make restitution to the other."'73 If one emphasizes the term "expense" in the
phrase "at the expense of another" and construes it as the equivalent of net
economic detriment, one might conceptualize restitution as a harm-repairing
remedy that measures the relief to be awarded by reference to the value of the
benefit conferred.
If, however, the phrase "at the expense of another" is read as a whole, it
could be understood to refer to whatever serves to link the defendant's enrichment
had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money." Comment b makes clear that the notion of
"benefit" is meant to be broad-encompassing the performance of service for another,
adding to the property of another, and saving another from expense or loss, i.e., "any form
of advantage." Id. § I cmt. b.
70.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTITUT1ON § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983)
(stating that restitution is predicated on the receipt of "a benefit by reason of an
infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other"). Efforts to draft
a Restatement (Second) of Restitution were abandoned in the mid-1980s, even though two

tentative drafts received the membership's approval at annual meetings. See AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 178 (1983); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1984
ANNUAL

REPORT

403 (1984). To my knowledge, no official explanation for the

abandonment of the project was ever offered, although a reader of the 1984 proceedings
might surmise that the discussion on the floor of the Institute did not go as well as the
project's supporters hoped, which might have led to a consensus to allow the project to
succumb with little fanfare.
71.
See I PALMER, supra note 54, § 2.10, at 133 ("Restitution is generally
awarded only in order to deprive the defendant of an enrichment obtained at the plaintiff's
expense.... The general requirement does not mean that the gain to the defendant need to be
equated to the loss to the plaintiff, nor indeed that there need be any loss to the plaintiff
except in the sense that a legally protected interest has been invaded.").
72.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Council Draft No. 1, 1999) ("A
person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the
other."). In 1997, the American Law Institute announced its intention to draft a Restatement
(Third) of Restitution. Efforts in the 1980s to draft a Restatement (Second) of Restitution

were abandoned. See supra note 70. Consideration had been given to incorporating the
subject of restitution into a new Restatement of Remedies, but the ALl Council decided to
embark upon a self-contained product. The reporter for the project is Professor Andrew
Kull.
73.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). Note that this formulation is
substantially identical to the foundational first section in the Council Draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution. See supra note 72.
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to an aggrieved party, thereby identifying a particular aggrieved party as the one to
whom an enrichment, if it cannot justifiably be retained by the defendant, ought to
be returned. 4 Under this construction, the "at the expense of another" phrase
serves primarily to identify the appropriate plaintiff, i.e., the one who deserves to
receive the sum that the enriched party must disgorge. This conceptualization
emphasizes a beneficiary's enrichment and largely disregards the conferring
party's detriment; under this formulation, the "expense" can be the "invasion of an
interest" belonging to the conferring party, unaccompanied by any kind of net
economic detriment.75
In short, there is much uncertainty about and disagreement over the
contours of the law of restitution.76 In such circumstances, the likelihood is low
that restitution will provide an incontestable explanation of why insurers are, or
are not, entitled to reimbursement of defense costs incurred in defending
noncovered claims. Although case law discussion of this issue is sparse, divergent
judicial views about the import of restitution in this context are already evident, as
the next subsection explains.
74.
In the comments to the Council Draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution, the Reporter uses the term "unjustified enrichment" to draw sharp distinctions
between some forms of unjust enrichment which the law of restitution will not remedy and
the more narrow, predictable, and objectively determinable circumstances in which an
adequate legal basis for a restitution remedy exists. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF
RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (Council Draft No. 1, 1999).

75.
This broader reading is part of the structure of the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Restitution. For example, illustration 5 to section 1 involves A repeatedly and
intentionally trespassing on B's land to avoid the higher costs of an alternative route and to
avoid paying B for a license. What A saves is deemed an unjustified enrichment for which
A is liable, "whether or not A's repeated trespass has caused any injury to B's land." Id. § I
illus. 5. This is an example of an unjust enrichment that involves no net economic detriment
but which is conferred at the expense of another. Id.
76.
See I DOBBS, supra note 54, at 551 ("Most generalizations about restitution
are trustworthy only so long as they are not very meaningful, and meaningful only so long
as they are not very trustworthy."); I PALMER, supra note 54, Preface ("Restitution has no
well-defined boundaries because it is concerned with unjust enrichment."); Kull,
Rationalizing,supra note 50, at 1194 (observing that the disagreement in restitution over
core principles "would be unthinkable" in the law of torts or contracts); id. at 1195
("Confusion over the content of restitution carries significant adverse consequences.");
Philip Mechem, A Realistic Treatment of Restitution, 25 IOWA L. REv. 187, 190 (1939)

(noting that the subject of restitution "is a truly superlative collection of jurisprudential
loose ends"); Stewart Macaulay, Comment, Restitution iin Context, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
1133, 1135 (1959) (stating that restitution represents the "relative freedom [of courts] to
decide cases unburdened by formal rules"). Comments in the current draft of the proposed
Restatement (Third) ofRestitution acknowledge the critique, even as the substantive content
of the draft seeks to dispel it: "Unless a definition of restitution can provide a more
informative generalization about the nature of the transactions leading to liability, it is
difficult to refute the objection that sees in 'unjust enrichment,' at best, a name for a legal
conclusion that remains to be explained; at worst, an open-ended and potentially
unprincipled charter of liability." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. b
(Council Draft No. 1, 1999).
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B. Restitution and Reimbursement: Divergent Judicial Views
One of the first cases to consider the insurer's right to reimbursement for
costs incurred in defending noncovered claims was Terra Nova Insurance Co. v.
900 Bar,Inc.7 In Terra Nova, a liability insurer sought a declaratory judgment on
the question of its duties to defend and indemnify the insured with respect to state
court actions brought by the insured's customers, who claimed they had been shot
in the insured's tavern by one of the insured's employees. The customers alleged
the insured's negligent and intentional infliction of serious bodily harm. The
insurer contended that the policy's assault and battery exclusion eliminated
coverage and that, as a consequence, the insurer had no duty to defend. The
procedural course of the case became complicated,78 but eventually the court
found it necessary to predict whether Pennsylvania law would allow an insurer to
obtain reimbursement of costs incurred in defending noncovered claims. On that
issue, the court reasoned that it would not, stating:
A rule permitting such recovery would be inconsistent with the
legal principles that induce an insurer's offer to defend under
reservation of rights. Faced with uncertainty as to its duty to
indemnify, an insurer offers a defense under reservation of rights to
avoid the risks that an inept or lackadaisical defense of the
underlying action may expose it to if it turns out there is a duty to
indemnify. At the same time, the insurer wishes to preserve its right
to contest the duty to indemnify if the defense is unsuccessful.
Thus, such an offer is made at least as much for the insurer's own
benefit as for the insured's. If the insurer could recover defense
costs, the insured would be required to pay for the insurer's action

887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1989).
77.
The district court stayed the insurer's declaratory judgment action, and the
78.
insurer appealed. The Third Circuit vacated the stay but directed the district court on
remand to dismiss the insurer's allegations that it had no duty to defend the insured. See id.
at 1216. Pennsylvania adheres to the potentiality rule, see Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica
Ins., 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987) (stating that the duty to defend exists "whenever the
complaint filed by the injured party may potentially come within the coverage of the
policy" (citing Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1963))), but
this rule was rendered irrelevant when the insurer, in making its case that no coverage
existed, "disclaimed any desire to go beyond the pleadings in the state court [i.e.,
underlying tort] suits." Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1216. On that record, the district court
found itself unable to conclude "that [the insurer] would not have to indemnify [the
insured,]" and this necessarily meant, according to the Third Circuit, that the insurer owed a
defense to the insured. Id. Before mandating this result, however, the Third Circuit vacated
the district court's stay; the court justified vacatur, in part, under the reasoning that the stay
order, if enforced, would moot the insurer's declaratory judgment action if the insurer were
forced to defend the insured and if Pennsylvania law would deny the insurer a
reimbursement right in the event the claims were subsequently determined to be outside
coverage. See id. at 1219-20.
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in protecting itself against the estoppel to deny coverage that would
be implied if it undertook the defense without reservation. 79
The court did not use the word "restitution" when discussing the
reimbursement right, but the law of restitution provided the framework for the

court's analysis. When observing that a defense is provided for the insurer's "own
benefit," the court was essentially stating that the insurer suffers no "loss" when
providing a defense under reservation. Although the insured receives a benefit in
such circumstances, the benefit is not received at the insurer's expense. Thus,
whatever benefit the insured receives is not "unjust," and no principle of fairness
requires the insured to return this benefit to the insurer.8" Indeed, if the insured
were forced to return the value of this benefit to the insurer, such a result would be
tantamount to making the insured pay for a benefit-protection for the insurer
against the outcome of being estopped to deny coverage-that the insurer decided,
acting unilaterally, to obtain for itself.
The reasoning of TerraNova was subsequently followed, either explicitly

or implicitly, in a few cases, 8 but other courts analyzed the issue very
differently.82 The most prominent of these cases was the California Supreme

79.
TerraNova, 887 F.2d at 1219-20.
80.
Under the framework of the proposed Restatement (Third) ofRestitution and
the reasoning of this case, this benefit--even if an enrichment-would not be an
"unjustified enrichment," and would not be a benefit that could not be
"conscientiously.. .retained." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTON § I cmt. b (Council
Draft No. 1, 1999).
81.
See Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 172 n.3
(M.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that "plaintiff [insurer] is not entitled to reimbursement of any of
its defense costs incurred" in defending the underlying action, which was terminated by a
settlement); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Alan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69-70 (Ct. App. 1990); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1986). In Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon
Oil Co., the court found the insurer's explicit reservation of the right to seek reimbursement
to be enough to enable it to seek recoupment. See Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil
Co., 902 F.2d 40, No. 88-2824, 1990 WL 55904, at *5 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table
decision). In a footnote, the court declined to reach the insurer's restitution and estoppel
theories of reimbursement under the reasoning that what it had said about the reservation
letter decided the case, but added that it was "doubtful that [the insurer] cobld prevail on
either [theory]," specifically mentioning that the cases discussing restitution went against
the insurer's position. Id. at *5 n.l. In In re Hansel, the liability insurer's claim for
litigation costs expended in defending noncovered claims was rejected on the ground that
the reservation letter did not make clear the insurer's intention to seek such costs in the
event of a no-coverage determination. See In re Hansel, 160 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1993). In dictum, the court noted the absence of any Texas law authorizing reimbursement,
and referred to pre-Buss California cases holding that the insurer lacks an equitable
restitution right to reimbursement of defense costs when the insurer's primary motive is to
protect its own interests by defending and not those of the insured. See id.
82.
See, e.g., Forum Ins. Co. v. County of Nye, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished table decision); Knapp v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp.
1169 (D. Minn. 1996); Resure v. Chemical Distribs., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. La.
1996), affd, 114 F.3d 1184 (unpublished table decision) (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
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Court's 1997 decision in Buss v. Superior Court.3 In the underlying litigation,
plaintiff H&H Sports ("H&H") filed a complaint containing twenty-seven causes
of action against Jerry Buss & California Sports, Inc. ("Buss"). 4 Buss tendered all
of the actions to his insurers for a defense, but each insurer-with the exception of
Transamerica Insurance Company ("Transamerica"), which had issued two
comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policies to Buss-denied coverage and
refused to defend. Transamerica accepted the defense of the H&H actions because
one of the twenty-seven causes of action-a defamation claim-was, in
Transamerica's judgment, at least potentially covered, even though the other
twenty-six causes of action were not. In light of the prevalence of noncovered
claims, Transamerica reserved all its rights, including the right to deny coverage
and to seek reimbursement of defense costs.85 Transamerica also agreed to provide
independent counsel for Buss. 6
Buss and H&H settled the underlying litigation for $8.5 million,"7 and
Transamerica paid Buss' independent counsel a sum just over $1 million. Of this
sum, an expert for Transamerica testified that a figure somewhere between two
and five percent of the total amount paid the independent counsel was the cost of
defending the defamation claim; thus, approximately $950,000 was expended by
Transamerica in defending noncovered claims. 8 Transamerica sought to recover
this sum from Buss.89 Transamerica prevailed in the court of appeals on the
reimbursement issue;' on Buss' petition, the supreme court granted review.9'
S. Ct. 1511 (1998); Gotham Ins. Co. v. GLNX, Inc., 92 Civ. 6415 (TPG), 1993 WL 312243
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1993); Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal.
Rptr. 688 (Ct. App. 1983) (giving insurer restitution for sums paid in defending suit); Hecla
Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
83.
939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). For a more detailed summary of the case, see
Richmond, supra note 11, at 480-85.
84.
In the underlying litigation, H&H alleged that Buss, the owner of various
sporting enterprises (such as the Los Angeles Lakers NBA basketball franchise, the Los
Angeles Kings NHL hockey franchise, and the Forum indoor sports arena), entered into
various contracts with H&H, under which H&H provided Buss with advertising and other
services. For a time, Buss performed his contract with H&H, but he subsequently
unilaterally terminated the contract. H&H sued, seeking over $297 million in damages. See
Buss, 939 P.2d at 769.
85.
See id. at 770. Transamerica's reservation letter stated that "[w]ith respect to
defense costs incurred or to be incurred in the future:' Transamerica reserved the right "to
be reimbursed and/or [to obtain] an allocation of attorney's fees and expenses in this action
if it is determined that there is no coverage...." Id. Thereafter, Buss and Transamerica
entered into an agreement, supported by consideration, providing that "[i]f a court.. .orders
that defense costs be shared pro rata by.. .Buss...and Transamerica,... Buss.. .shall
reimburse Transamerica for the appropriate pro rata share of the fees and costs paid to that
date." Id.
86.
See id.
See id.
87.
88.
See id.
The issues arose in this manner: After Transamerica refused to contribute to
89.
the settlement, Buss sued Transamerica, complaining about Transamerica's denial of a duty

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:13

At the outset, the court explained that under California law the insurer has
a duty to defend potentially covered claims as soon as the defense of the
underlying claims is tendered and until the underlying litigation is concluded.'
Accordingly, in an action where all claims are potentially covered, the insurer has
a duty to defend; but if no claims are potentially covered, the insurer has no duty
to defend.93 If potentially covered claims and noncovered claims are combined in
the same complaint (thereby giving rise to a "mixed action"), the insurer's
contractualduty to defend extends to the potentially covered claims only.94 Even
to defend all claims in H&H's suit and its refusal to contribute to the settlement. In a crosscomplaint, Transamerica alleged that Buss denied its right to reimbursement of defense
costs incurred in defending everything except the defamation action, and denied its
obligation to contribute to the settlement. Transamerica sought summary judgment against
Buss on Buss' complaint, which the court granted based on its conclusion that there was no
"reasonable basis for Transamerica to join in the settlement" on the defamation cause of
action. Buss then moved for summary judgment against Transamerica on its crosscomplaint for reimbursement for defense costs, and this motion was denied. Buss then filed
a petition for writ of mandate in the court of appeals. See id. at 770-71.
90.
The court of appeals denied a peremptory writ, finding no error and holding
as follows:
[A]n insurer may not seek reimbursement from an insured for defense
costs as to claims that are at least potentially covered-in the H & H
Sports action, the defamation cause of action against Buss; it may,
however, seek reimbursement for costs as to those that are not-in that
action, all the others; it may obtain reimbursement for the costs that can
be allocated solely to these claims; to do so, it must carry the burden of
proof; the burden it must carry is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence....
Id. at 771-72.
91.
See id. at 772.
92.
The court contrasted the duty to defend with the duty to indemnify. The
latter "runs to claims that are actually covered, in light of the facts proved.... It arises only
after liability is established." Id. at 773 (citations omitted). The duty to defend, in contrast,
runs to claims that are merely potentially covered, in light of facts
alleged or otherwise disclosed. It arises as soon as tender is made. It is
discharged when the action is concluded.... It may be extinguished
earlier, if it is shown that no claim can in fact be covered. If it is so
extinguished, however, it is extinguished only prospectively and not
retroactively: before, the insurer had a duty to defend; after, it does not
have a duty to defend further.
Id. (citations omitted).
Thus, "the insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. But, just as
obviously, it is not unlimited. It extends beyond claims that are actually covered to those
that are merely potentially so-but no further." Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
93.
The court explained that the "freedom" not to defend noncovered claims "is
implied in the policy's language. It rests on the fact that the insurer has not been paid
premiums by the insured for a defense." Id. at 774.
94.
See id. The rationale for this conclusion was grounded in the fact that the
insured pays a premium for the defense of covered claims, and pays nothing for a defense
of noncovered claims. See id. Justice Kennard disagreed with this conclusion, reasoning
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so, as the court explained, the insurer has a duty implied by law to defend the
mixed action in its entirety.'- Thus, when the insurer performs the noncontractual
implied duty and defends a mixed action in its entirety, the insured may receive
extra-contractual benefits from the insurer.96 In conceptualizing the insurer's duty
that the insurer's duty to defend noncovered claims was contractually based, rather than
implied-in-law, in that the text of the policy requires the insurer to defend "suits, rather than
individual claims." Id. at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The insurer's interest in defending
noncovered claims comes from the insurer's desire to control the defense of all claims; in
other words, in exchange for the insured giving up the right to control the defense of
noncovered claims, which enables the insurer to better control the defense of covered
claims, the insurer agrees to pay for the defense of the entire suit. See id. As a matter of
textual interpretation, "suit" and "claim" presumably have different meanings, or the
drafters would have used only one of the words. Note that later in the "Insuring
Agreement, .... suit or claim" appears in the disjunctive, whereas in the "right and duty"
sentence of the insuring agreement, only the word "suit" appears. Arguably, then, the
meaning of the "duty to defend" language is that the insurer has the duty to defend the
entire suit, i.e., a duty to defend any suit in which at least one covered claim is made against
the insured. Note that policies in other lines of insurance (such as homeowners and
automobile) refer to both claims and suits, suggesting that the CGL was drafted differently
for a reason. Thus, the dissent's textual argument in Buss is quite strong. Insurers typically
find themselves on the side of textual literalism; in this setting, literalism does not serve
insurers' interests well.
Notwithstanding the strength of the dissent's argument, it is doubtful that the drafters
intended the meaning given to the CGL by the dissent. Because, under this interpretation,
the insurer would have a duty to pay for the defense of all noncovered claims as long as at
least one covered claim was asserted, plaintiffs' counsel would have a powerful incentive to
insert at least one covered claim in every complaint-which is tantamount to moral hazard
run rampant. The drafters surely did not intend the defense obligation to reach so far, and it
is doubtful that policyholders desire such broad coverage. See supra text accompanying
notes 42-43; infra text accompanying notes 230-233. Courts have confronted a similar
issue in the situation where the insured sues the insurer for reimbursement of defense costs
after the insurer has breached the duty to defend; in this context, there is authority for the
proposition that the insurer's reimbursement obligation is limited to covered claims, and
that no reimbursement obligation exists for noncovered claims, i.e., claims that are not even
potentially within the coverage. See, e.g., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
929 F. Supp. 764 (D.N.J. 1996).
95.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775.
[W]e can, and do, justify the insurer's duty to defend the entire 'mixed'
action prophylactically, as an obligation imposed by law in support of
the policy. To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend
immediately. To defend immediately, it must defend entirely. It cannot
parse the claims, dividing those that are at least potentially covered from
those that are not. To do so would be time consuming. It might also be
futile: The 'plasticity of modem pleading' allows the transformation of
claims that are at .least potentially covered into claims that are not, and
vice versa.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
96.
See id.
As to the claims that are at least potentially covered, the insurer gives,
and the insured gets, just what they bargained for, namely, the mounting
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to defend mixed actions as an extracontractual, implied-in-law duty, the court laid
the groundwork for the restitution analysis that would follow.
In that next discussion, the court considered whether "[i]n a 'mixed'
action.. .the insurer [may] seek reimbursement from the insured for defense
costs."97 The court's answer was "no" with respect to potentially covered claims,9"
but "yes" with respect to noncovered claims." In explaining why the insurer has
no right to reimbursement for potentially covered claims, the court initially
observed that the insurance contract does not implicitly create a right to
reimbursement, given that the insurer agreed to bear the costs of defense."°
Moreover, no right to reimbursement can be implied in law; because the insurer
bargained to bear defense costs, any resulting enrichment of the insured is "just,"
and, therefore, no right to restitution exists.'' But with respect to claims that are
not even potentially covered, the insurer did not bargain to bear the costs of
defense, and the insurer's attempt to recoup these costs does not "upset the
arrangement" in the liability insurance contract.'" The insurer's right is "implied
in law as quasi-contractual"; that is, the insurer can recoup its costs, the
expenditure of which unjustly enriches the insured, under the law of restitution:

and funding of a defense. But as to the claims that are not, the insurer
may give, and the insured may get, more than they agreed, depending on
whether defense of these claims necessitates any additional costs.
Id.
97.

Id. at 775.

98.
See id. The court explained that the answer would change to "yes" if the
policy itself provides for reimbursement. Also, the answer would change to "yes" if the
insured and insurer subsequently agree in a separate contract superseding the policy that the
insurer is entitled to reimbursement. See id. at 776.
99.

See id.

100.
See id. at 775. Also, under this analysis, an attempted reservation of right to
seek reimbursement on potentially covered claims is ineffective, given that there is no right
to be reserved. Stated otherwise, a unilateral reservation of a "right" not given in the policy
cannot supersede the policy, i.e., cannot create the nonexistent right. See id. at 776.
101.

See id.

102.
Id. Inother parts of the opinion, the court placed the burden on the insurer to
establish that the defense costs for which reimbursement is sought are solely allocable to
claims for which there was no potential for coverage. See id. at 778-83. As the court
acknowledged, establishing that the costs can be so segregated will not be easy in most
situations. See id. at 780-81. For this reason, some commentators have observed that Buss
is, in reality, a limited victory for insurers. See Menter, supra note 11, at 3 (observing the
insurer's ability to obtain reimbursement is "[l]imited and [r]isky"); Richmond, supra note
1i,at 508 (discussing burdens on insurers and the limitation of the rule of the case to mixed
actions).
103.
See Buss, 939 P.2d at 777. This assumes, of course, that the insurer takes
appropriate steps to reserve its right to reimbursement. In a footnote, the court explained
what the insurer must do to perfect the reservation. See id. at 784 n.27. For more discussion
of the mechanics of reserving a right to reimbursement, see Richmond, supra note 1I, at
505-07.
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The "enrichment" of the insured by the insurer through the insurer's
bearing of unbargained-for defense costs is inconsistent with the
insurer's freedom under the policy and therefore must be deemed
"unjust." It is like the case of A and B. A has a contractual duty to pay B
$50. He has only a $100 bill. He may be held to have a prophylactic
duty to tender the note. But he surely has a right, implied in law if not in
fact, to get back $50.104
At the end of its analysis, the court asserted that recognizing the right of
reimbursement makes "good sense" as well: the availability of the right reduces
the temptation the insurer might otherwise have to deny the insured a defense in
mixed actions where noncovered claims predominate, given that the insurer
escapes the possibility of not recouping any of its
expenses for defending
05
noncovered claims if the insurer does not defend at all.1
Subsequent California cases, as one would expect, have consistently
followed Buss,"° and the relatively few courts outside California to subsequently
consider the issue have reached conclusions generally consistent with Buss.'0 7 The
analysis of Terra Nova remains viable, however, and there is a possibility that the
Texas Supreme Court soon will consider whether the insurer has a reimbursement
right under the law of restitution.0 8 Continued variance in judicial assessment of
the restitution-based rationale for the insurer's reimbursement right should not be
surprising given that the law of restitution is, at best, equivocal on the question.
This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

104.
Buss, 939 P.2d at 777.
105.
See id. at 778.
106.
See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1997); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 627 (Ct. App.
1998); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Ridout Roofing Co., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 291 (Ct. App.
1998); State v. Pacific Indem. Co., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 75-77 (Ct. App. 1998).
107.
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp., 153 F.3d 919 (8th
Cir. 1998); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Shierk, 996 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. I11.
1998); cases cited supra note 82. In Liberty Mutual, the court denied the insurer's request
for reimbursement, but presumably because the sole allegation in the complaint was
potentially covered, and was therefore analogous to the potentially covered defamation
claim in Buss for which the insurer had a duty to defend. See Liberty Mutual, 153 F.3d at
924.
108.
In Matagorda County v. Texas Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk
Management Pool, 975 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), review granted (June 24, 1999),
the court considered the issue of an insurer's right to reimbursement, but decided the case
on a more limited ground. See id. at 786. The court, which, curiously enough, cited both
Buss and Terra Nova with approval, held that the insurer was not entitled to reimbursement
of defense costs because the reservation of rights letter did not contain any suggestion that
the insurer would attempt to recover defense costs. See id. at 785. A reasonable inference
from the court's discussion of cases in other jurisdictions is that the insurer might have been
entitled to reimbursement if it had clearly and unambiguously reserved its right to seek
reimbursement, but this is not clear from the opinion. See id. at 784-85.
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C. Restitution as a Justification for Defense Cost Reimbursement
When coverage is in doubt for some or all of the claims alleged against
the insured, the insurer has essentially three options: defend without qualification
or reservation; defend under reservation; or refuse to defend."° The first
alternative is ill-advised because the insurer who does so is universally deemed to
have waived all coverage defenses." 0 Unless the insurer is certain that coverage
does not exist, the third alternative is extremely perilous. If a court subsequently
determines that the complaint alleged a covered claim (in eight-comers
jurisdictions) or thatthere was a mere potentiality of coverage (in jurisdictions
following the potentiality rule), the insurer's declination constitutes a breach of the
duty to defend, with all of the consequences that flow from the breach."' Thus,
insurers typically opt in such situations to defend the insured under a reservation
of rights. An insurer's proposed arrangement with its insured to defend under
reservation has three basic elements:
1. We (the insurer) are not certain whether one or more of the
plaintiff's claims against you (the insured) are covered by your
policy with us. They might be covered, or they might not.
2. Because of our uncertainty (that is, because there is a
possibility that the claims might subsequently be found to be
covered), we are going to provide you with a defense to these
claims. In other words, we are going to provide a defense in
accordance with the standards that our contract would require if
the claim were indisputably within coverage.
3. Even though we will defend you, we reserve the right to argue
that one or more of the claims are outside the policy's coverage.
If we choose to argue this position later and if we prevail, we
will not be obligated to pay whatever judgment, if any, was
entered against you in the plaintiff's action.
If the insurer is interested in recouping defense costs, a fourth element
will be added to the preceding three:
4. Should it be determined at a later time that the claims are not
covered, we will seek from you reimbursement of the costs we
expended in defending the noncovered claims.
The insurer's ability to reserve the right to contest coverage (item 3
above) has never been seriously doubted."' Indeed, some courts have instructed
109.

See Richmond, supra note II, at 467.

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 33, § 2.02, at 45 (citing
representative cases).
See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § IlI [h], at 752-60; 1 WINDT, supra note
Ill.
25, §§ 4.33-.38, at 256-71.
112.
The consequences of the reservation on the responsibilities of defense
counsel has, however, received much attention and in some jurisdictions has been
controversial. See I WINDT, supra note 25, § 4.20, at 219-25. But even in jurisdictions that
110.
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insurers to proceed in precisely this manner when they are uncertain about the
existence of coverage." 3 Thus, one might wonder why reserving the right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs (item 4 above) is controversial at all. In either
circumstance-reserving a right to contest coverage or reserving a right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs-the insurer takes the position that it has no
obligation to spend resources absent a contractual requirement that it do so. Yet
the reservations, though similar in form, are substantively quite different. When
the insurer reserves the right to contest coverage, the insurer is stating an intention
with respect to a separate duty in the liability insurance contract; the insurer says,
"we will defend you, but if we lose this lawsuit, we may contest our separate duty
to indemnify you by subsequently taking the position that the plaintiff s claims are
outside the coverage of your policy." If the duty to indemnify is contested, this
will occur before the insurer performs it."' With respect to the reservation to seek
reimbursement of defense costs, the insurer is reserving a right with respect to the
duty being undertaken. That is, the insurer says, "we will defend you, but we
reserve the right to later argue that we were not obligated to do so because the
plaintiffs claims are outside the policy's coverage (or are not potentially covered
by the policy); and if we are successful, we will seek reimbursement for the costs
we incurred in providing you with this defense." In this respect, then, the defense
cost reservation creates the possibility that the insurer will ask for a return of what
it presently gives. Nothing of permanence is promised; the insurer says, in effect,
"we will pay for this today, but tomorrow we may insist that you pay for it-by
paying to us the amounts that we will pay on your behalf today." The right to
contest coverage, by itself, only states that a disputed issue involving the insurer's
indemnity obligation is being postponed until later." 5 Though hardly
inconsequential to an insured, putting off resolution of the indemnity obligation
until later has relatively little immediate impact on the insured; the postponed issue
have concluded that the reservation has adverse consequences for the insurer's right to
control the defense, the insurer's ability to reserve the right to contest coverage has not
been doubted.
See, e.g., Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228 (D. Colo.
113.
1999) (stating that the "appropriate course of action for an insurer who believes that it is
under no obligation to defend, is to provide a defense to the insured under a reservation of
its rights to seek reimbursement should the facts at trial prove that" coverage does not exist,
or "to file a declaratory judgment action after the underlying case has been adjudicated");
Sims v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 193 N.E.2d 123, 130 (Il1.App. Ct. 1963); Patrons Mut. Ins.
Ass'n v. Harmon, 732 P.2d 741, 745 (Kan. 1987).
One exception to this ordering involves the situation where the insurer
114.
settles the plaintiffs underlying tort action in circumstances where coverage is doubtful,
and the insurer pays the claimant while reserving a right to seek reimbursement of the
settlement from the insured in the event the claim is found to be outside coverage. In this
situation, courts have generally held that the insurer may make such a reservation. For more
discussion, see infra note 220.
115.
See I WINDT, supra note 25, § 4.26, at 236. "By reserving its rights [to
contest coverage], the insurer is not imposing conditions on its defense. The defense
remains unqualified; the insurer, by reserving its rights, is merely putting the insured on
notice of what the insurer believes are its existing rights under the policy." Id.
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might become moot if the insured is found to owe nothing to the plaintiff in the
underlying action, and the insured receives something of value-a defense-in the
meantime. But if the coverage reservation is coupled with the defense
reimbursement reservation, the present value received by the insured is
substantially reduced. The stark reality confronting the insured is that every
expense being incurred in the defense could, conceivably, become the insured's
responsibility at a later time.
Liability insurance contracts neither specify the procedures an insurer is
to follow when reserving rights nor state the consequences of such a reservation.
With respect to a reservation to deny the indemnity obligation at a later time, these
omissions are not problematic. This kind of reservation presents no particular
theoretical problem; its essence is the insurer putting the insured on notice that the
performance of duty A (defense) should not cause the insured to understand that
the insurer has agreed to perform duty B (indemnity) later. No value is transferred
presently with respect to duty B, and whether such a transfer is even required is a
question being postponed until a later time, perhaps indefinitely. Because the
insurer does not propose taking something from the insured or seeking a return
from the insured of something that the insurer will confer, there is no need to
articulate a theory that authorizes a future reallocation of value. When a defense is
provided, however, a transfer of value occurs; the insured receives a defense and
the insurer pays for it. In the absence of a legal principle explaining why this value
must be returned to the insurer, the insured should be allowed to retain what the
insurer has intentionally, voluntarily conferred." 6 If the insurer and insured
expressly contract, either in the insurance policy or at the time of the reservation,
that the insurer shall have this right, the express agreement provides the authority
for the reallocation." 7 In the usual case, however, this express agreement does not
exist,"' and the justification for the reallocation must be found in other sources.
Restitution is the theory that has been offered to justify the reallocation (i.e.,
reimbursement of defense costs) that insurers desire. But the malleable principles
of restitution, when brought to bear on the defense cost reimbursement issue, can
116.
Deeply embedded in the common law is a straightforward principle. When a
person voluntarily donates property or services to another, this person has bestowed a
gratuity upon the recipient, and the recipient is allowed to keep the property or the benefit
absent some superseding doctrine requiring its return. This principle is most apparent in the
law of donative transfers. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.5, at 51 (3d ed.
1999); IV PALMER, supra note 54, § 18.1, at 2 ("At common law, inter vivos gifts, that is,
those intended to take effect during the donor's lifetime, are irrevocable unless expressly
made revocable.").
117.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
118.
Such an express agreement could be placed in the liability insurance
contract. However, as noted earlier, the liability insurance forms currently in widespread
use do not speak to, let alone create, a reimbursement right. See supra text following note
28. In addition, the reservation of rights letter does not seek the insured's explicit assent to
the reservation; rather, the reservation is a unilateral announcement of the insurer's
intentions. For discussion of the differences between nonwaiver agreements and reservation
of rights notices, see JERRY, supra note 1, § I14[c][3], at 795-98.
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be deployed either to support or to defeat the insurer's right, This equivocation
suggests the need for the discovery and application of a more determinant
analytical approach.
As a threshold matter, restitution requires that the defendant have
received a benefit." 9 This presents no particular difficulty in the situation of the
insurer-provided defense, although it is worth noting that the insured's benefit is
atypical when compared to that which the defendant receives in the paradigmatic
restitution case. The thief, for example, is enriched at the expense of the victim, 2 '
and the recipient of an erroneously directed gift is enriched at the expense of the
intended donee. 2 ' In such cases, the defendant's assets are tangibly enriched by
the benefit. In contrast, the insurer-provided defense does not "inflate" the
insured's assets, but instead simply prevents the insured's assets from being
"deflated," i.e., the insured does not lose resources the insured would have spent if
the insured had been forced to secure its own defense.
This distinction should not matter."n But if the existence of a valid
restitution claim is predicated on an understanding of "benefif' which requires
some kind of visible enhancement of a party's well-being, the distinction would
become hugely important. To put this point in a fuller context, consider that when
the insured tenders the defense of a claim to the insurer, the insured ordinarily
takes the position that the insurer must provide the defense to satisfy its.
contractual obligations to the insured. If the insured's position is correct, it is fair
to say that the insured is advantaged from the receipt of the insurer-provided
defense, but this advantage is the insured's contractual entitlement and is,
however, the insured's position is incorrect and
therefore, not unjustly received. If,
the insured receives a defense to noncovered claims, it is likewise fair to say that
119.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, at 12-15 (1937). Section 1 states that
"[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other." Comment a states that "[a] person is enriched if he has received a
benefit," and that "[a] person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be
unjust." Id. § I cmt. a. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. b (Council
Draft No. 1, 1999) ("Liability in restitution is triggered by the receipt of a benefit, under
circumstances such that the recipient is not justified in retaining the benefit without paying
for it.").
120.
See I PALMER, supra note 54, § 1.1, at 3 (explaining restitutionary remedy
for benefit received by thief). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b
(Council Draft No. 1, 1999) ("Liability in restitution is triggered by the receipt of a benefit,
under circumstances such that the recipient is not justified in retaining the benefit without
paying for it."); id. § 1 cmt. c (Council Draft No. 1, 1999) (noting that restitution is
unnecessary to explain why a thief must return stolen goods to the true owner). See also
supra note 54.
121.
See IV PALMER, supra note 54, § 18.9, at 69-91 (discussing restitution in
favor of intended donee of gift mistakenly made to the wrong person).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2 cmt. c (Council Draft No. 1,
122.
1999). ("Restitution is concerned with the conferral of benefits that yield a measurable
increase in the recipient's wealth.... A saved expenditure or a discharged obligation is no
less beneficial to the recipient than a direct transfer.").
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the insured is advantaged through the receipt of a free service for which the
insured would otherwise have been required to pay. This advantage is not a
tangible, visible, or measurable enhancement in the insured's wealth; rather, the
insured is advantaged only in the sense of being prevented from suffering an outof-pocket loss. If, for example, one hypothesizes an insured who has no assets, one
could plausibly argue that the insured has no out-of-pocket "loss" to suffer and
thus, by extension, receives no "benefit" from the provision of the insurerprovided defense. However one describes the insured's side of the equation, the
insurer suffers loss in an amount equal to the cost of providing a defense to
noncovered claims. Thus, it is plausible to assert that the insurer's restitution claim
in the foregoing context, unlike the more common situations where restitution is
invoked, is aimed not so much at retrieving a benefit obtained by the insuredbecause there is nothing to be retrieved-but at compensating the insurer for an
out-of-pocket cost that the insurer contends should have been incurred by the
insured. In other words, the insurer's claim appears to be more in the nature of
remedying the insurer's reliance, rather than disgorging the insured's benefit.
Whatever facial appeal might be embedded in the foregoing reasoning, it
would abuse the settled law of restitution if such reasoning were embraced.
Excluding expenditures that prevent another from suffering loss from the scope of
"benefit" would constrict restitution's justice-enhancing role." The commentary
to section 1 of the Restatement of Restitution explains: "[A person] confers a
benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves
the other from expense of loss. The word 'benefit,' therefore, denotes any form of
advantage."' 2 Plainly, the insured that is defended for noncovered claims is
advantaged in the sense of being saved from expense or loss, and this advantage is
attained at the insurer's expense. Thus, an alleged lack of "benefit" to the insured
is not a plausible basis for denying the existence of a reimbursement right."5
That the insured is benefitted by a defense to noncovered claims is
obvious; whether the insured is unjustly enriched is less so. Restitution does not
authorize recoupment of all benefits, but only benefits which, if retained, would
unjustly enrich the party on which the benefit is conferred. 26 The "unjust" element
of restitution is most difficult because it essentially involves a normative
conclusion that it would offend conscience, notions of fair dealing, or equitable

123.

See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
RESTATEMENT OF REsTTrruTioN § 1 cmt. b (1937). The proposed Restatement
(Third) of Restitution is consistent with this conception of benefit. See supra note 122.
125.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
126.
SeeRESTATEMENTOFREST rTTiON § I cmt. c (1937)
Even where a person has received a benefit from another, he is liable to
pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such
that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it. The
mere fact that a person benefits another is not of itself sufficient to
require the other to make restitution therefor.
124.
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norms if a benefit were received and not returned. 27 From the pro-reimbursement
perspective, the argument favoring restitution is straightforward: The insured paid
a premium to receive a defense to and indemnity for covered claims. No premium
was paid for a defense to or indemnity for noncovered claims. Thus, when the
insured receives a defense to a noncovered claim, the insured receives more than
the contractual entitlement at the expense of another. The insured has no
reasonable expectation of being allowed to retain the benefit, and it would be
unjust if the insured does not pay the insurer for the extracontractual benefit it
receives.' 2
If duress is a factor that causes a party to confer the benefit, the
conferring party's case for restitution is strengthened.' 29 Translated to the insuredinsurer relationship, the argument is that the insured, bolstered by rules that allow
the insured robust remedies in the event the insurer fails to perform its duty to
defend,' essentially extorts the insurer's defense of noncovered claims. The
insurer, arguably, faces a risk of forfeiture-the actual and consequential damages
associated with breaching the duty to defend-that effectively coerces the insurer
to defend noncovered claims.' The insured's hand is further strengthened by
127.
See LAYCOCK, supra note 65, at 524-25 ("The substantive law of restitution
is largely devoted to distinguishing between just and unjust enrichments.... Unjust
enrichment is in fact undefinable...."); I PALMER, supra note 54, § 1.7, at 41 ("Issues of
considerable difficulty sometimes arise with respect to the question whether there is an
enrichment, but in a much larger number of cases the problem is whether retention of a
recognizable enrichment is unjust."); Kull, Rationalizing, supra note 50, at 1226 ("The
central problem of the law of restitution is to identify those instances of enrichment that the
law regards as unjust.").
128.
This is the logic of the Buss decision. See supra notes 83-105 and
accompanying text.
129.
See RESTATEMENT (THPRD) OF RESTITtuTION § 14 (Council Draft No. 1, 1999)
("A transfer induced by duress is subject to recission at the instance of the transferor or a
successor in interest."); II PALMER, supra note 54, §§ 9.1-.19.
130.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § Ill[h], at 752-60 (discussing remedies for
breach of the duty to defend).
131.
This argument is developed more fully by William Barker. See Barker, supra
note 11, at 547-48. To support this argument, Barker analogizes to the situation sometimes
faced by the insured with a life or disability policy containing a waiver of premium in the
event the insured is totally disabled. If the insurer and insured disagree about whether the
insured is disabled, the insured who suspends payment of premium runs the risk that he or
she will forfeit coverage for nonpayment of premiums in the event the insurer's position
turns out to be correct. But if the insured's payment of the premium were deemed voluntary
and a right to restitution denied in the event the insured's position were vindicated, the
insured would lose the benefit of the waiver of premium provision. Barker acknowledges
that courts have split in their assessment of whether the insured's payment of premiums
while the dispute is pending is made under duress, thereby entitling the insured to a refund
of premiums paid in circumstances where the insured's position is vindicated. See id. at 547
& nn.31-32 (citing cases). An obvious difference between the disability situation and the
reimbursement of defense costs issue is that the insured under a disability policy is a oneshot player, and lacks the expertise needed to adequately assess the risks of paying, or not
paying, the premium. The insurer, in contrast, has considerable expertise and sophistication
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information asymmetries that run against the insurer. With respect to the plaintiff's
claim against the insured, the insured will often know the true facts about the
insured's involvement, if any, in the circumstances giving rise to plaintiffs claim.
That the insurer will have multiple sources of information is hardly guaranteed;
indeed, the insurer may depend to a significant extent on the insured for the
revelation of these facts. The insured's natural desire that the insurer fund the
insured's defense provides an incentive for the insured to disclose facts in a
manner that will maximize the probability that the insurer will provide a defense.
The insured is constrained by the policy's requirement that the insured cooperate
with the insurer, but the insured can be expected to test the limits of this duty if the
insured's candor is likely to risk the loss of the insurer-funded defense. In these
circumstances, the insurer is at the insured's mercy and is therefore entitled to
restitution under the reasoning that the insurer provided, under duress, defenses to
claims that turned out to be beyond the scope of the policy's coverage.132
Notwithstanding the superficial plausibility of the foregoing duress
argument, its foundation is tenuous. Clearly, the potential consequences of
breaching the duty to defend give the insurer a significant incentive to provide a
defense when coverage is in doubt. Moreover, the risks to the insurer from not
defending go far to undercut the argument, discussed in more detail below, that the
insurer is a mere volunteer or officious intermeddler when it provides a defense to
claims that prove to be outside the coverage.' But showing that someone is not
when deciding the conditions under which it should undertake the defense of an insured.
See Quinn, supra note 11, at 610.
132.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 cmt. d-Ill (Council Draft
No. 1, 1999).
Coercive means are consistently held to be wrongful, notwithstanding
that they may be both legally authorized and employed in good faith, to
the extent that they induce a payment not due in respect of a subsisting
claim.... The consistent pattern of decisions in such cases is explained
by observing that a payment of money not due-the payment being
made, and the true obligation measured, with reference to the parties'
preexisting legal obligations-gives rise to prima facie unjustified
enrichment and a claim in retitution to recover the excess.
Id.
An illustration in the Council Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution could be
read as giving support to this analysis:
Insurer requests in good faith that Policyholder pay an additional
premium, announcing that it will cancel the policy if payment is not
received. Policyholder correctly interprets the policy to provide that
premiums have been waived. To avoid the risk of a lapse in coverage,
however, Policyholder pays the premium demanded, then sues in
restitution to recover the payment. Under the circumstances, Insurer's
threat to cancel was wrongful; Policyholder's payment was involuntary;
and Policyholder may recover the amount of the disputed premium.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 illus. I I (Council Draft No. 1, 1999).
From the insurer's perspective in the reimbursement context, the following occurs:
insured makes a good faith request for defense of a claim; insurer correctly interprets the
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acting in the status of a volunteer is not equivalent to demonstrating that the
person is acting under duress. Duress presupposes that the aggrieved party has no
reasonable alternative.'
The insurer, however, has multiple alternatives:
defending unqualifiedly; defending under reservation; or declining to defend.'35
The insurer has expertise as a repeat player in the activity of assessing complaints
and fact patterns and has considerable investigative resources at its disposal. The
insurer's choice of alternative likely will reflect a calculated assessment of which
course is in the insurer's best interest under the circumstances.' 36 Policyholders can
exploit information asymmetries to their advantage, but it is far from clear that
even aggressive exploitation amounts to coercion of insurers as they consider how
to respond to tenders of defenses when coverage is doubtful.
The pro-reimbursement perspective might also seek support in the cases
where restitution is awarded under the reasoning that one party conferred a benefit
on another by mistake. The mistake cases in the law of restitution are numerous"'
and the fact patterns are extraordinarily diverse. They include such situations as a
party, for example, being mistaken about what is owed under a contract and

policy as providing no coverage; to avoid the risk of damages for breach of the duty to
defend, insured defends anyway and then seeks to recover cost of the defense.
The reimbursement context, however, is different. If the insurer correctly interprets the
policy as providing no coverage and is confident of that interpretation, the insurer should
decline to defend. The defense under reservation in that circumstance is, unquestionably,
strategic, which cuts against the insurer's claim. See infra note 136 (discussing further the
voluntary payment exception in this context). Moreover, when the threat inducing payment
is a threat of civil litigation only, the threat is not wrongful and is, instead, "legalized
coercion." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 cmt. e (Council Draft No. 1, 1999).
In Restatement (Third) of Restitution, the policyholder pays the premium to keep the

coverage in force; in the reimbursement context, the insurer defends to counter the
policyholder's good faith threat to seek damages in civil litigation for breach of the duty to
defend. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 illus. 11. Thus, by this analysis, the
insurer's defense under reservation does not occur under duress.
133.
See infra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
134.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (stating that the
elements of duress include an "improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no
reasonable alternative").
135.

See supra note 109.

136.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 cmi. d-I11 (Council Draft
No. 1, 1999) ("Properly understood, the doctrine of voluntary payment bars a claim in
restitution only where the payor has assumed the risk that the payment is not in fact due, or
where the payment is strategic."). Under the reasoning that the insurer defends claims for
both the insured's and its own benefit and makes a strategic decision about whether to
decline coverage or undertake the defense under reservation, it arguably follows that the
insurer's acquiesence in the insured's request for a defense when coverage is indoubt is not
coerced-that is, the insurer assumes the risk that the claim may not be covered.
137.
Nine of the 23 chapters in the preeminent Palmer treatise on restitution are
devoted to various aspects of mistake. See II, III & IV PALMER, supra note 54, §§ 12.120.17.
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therefore doing more than his or her contractual obligation,' being mistaken
about to whom something is owed and therefore performing for the wrong
40
person, 39 being mistaken about the effect of a statute or other legal principle,
and being mistaken about the legal ramifications of a party's acts. 4' Because the
results in these cases tend to be fact-dependent, it is virtually impossible to
reconcile the outcomes.
Yet one of the unifying principles of the law of mistake is that the person
who received a benefit by mistake should not be entitled, subject to some
exceptions, to retain the benefit; such a retention would be "unjust," and the
person should be required to return the benefit to the plaintiff, thereby restoring
the plaintiff to the position occupied before the mistake was made.' 42 In the
insurance defense situation, the pro-reimbursement perspective can reason that the
insurer, in defending a noncovered claim, has done so by mistake, and the benefits
bestowed upon the insured ought to be returned. This position can draw upon the
considerable number of cases recognizing an insurer's right to restitution of
payments made to the wrong person,'43 under a mistaken assumption that a loss

138.
See, e.g., Dorchester Exploration, Inc. v. Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc., 504 F.
Supp. 926, 937 (D. Kan. 1980) (stating that a buyer of natural gas who paid sellers a price
increase eight months prematurely under erroneous belief that parties' contract required
such payment, was entitled to restitution of the excess payment); Talley v. Talley, 566
N.W.2d 846, 853 (S.D. 1997) (awarding for unjust enrichment where contract for sale of
cattle misinterpreted, resulting in an overpayment); I DOBBS, supra note 54, at 553 (stating
that restitution is appropriate as remedy for mistakenly overpaying money).
139.
See, e.g., Stratton v. Hanning, 294 P.2d 66, 68-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)
(upholding right of tenant to recover rental funds previously paid to one mistakenly
believed to be owner of property); 1 DOBBS, supra note 54, at 553 (stating that restitution is
appropriate as remedy for mistakenly delivering property to the wrong person).
140.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 5 (Council Draft No. 1, 1999)
(stating that "[a] transfer gives rise to a claim in restitution if the transfer was induced by
invalidating mistake[,]" and "[i]nvalidating mistake is a misapprehension of fact or law on
the part of the transferor").
141.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 46 (1937) (discussing restitution for
person who has conferred a benefit upon another because of an erroneous belief induced by
a mistake of law that he or she is obligated to do so).
142.
See id. ch. 2, Introductory Note.
There is no universal principle that one who makes a mistake in the
conferring of a benefit is entitled to restitution. Nevertheless, if a benefit
is conferred because of a serious mistake of fact by the transferor and he
has not agreed to assume the risk of mistake, he is entitled to restitution
unless the transferee or beneficiary is protected by virtue of the fact that
he is a contracting party or a bona fide purchaser, or unless there is some
other reason which makes it inequitable or inexpedient for restitution to
be granted.
Id.

143.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 6 cmt. b. & illus. 5 (Council
Draft No. 1, 1999) (discussing mistaken payment made to insured who has submitted no
claim); JERRY, supra note I, § 99[e], at 659 (stating that insurer who pays proceeds to
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or under a mistaken understanding about the insurance contract's

1

The opposing argument emphasizes that the insurer is not "mistaken"
about its performance, for in undertaking a defense in circumstances of uncertainty
over coverage, the insurer has done exactly what it intended to do, with full
knowledge and appreciation of the attendant uncertainty. In many situations,
conscious, deliberate assumption of risk (i.e., proceeding in the face of
uncertainty) takes away whatever entitlement one has to relief based upon
mistake. 46 In fact, this theme is one that runs throughout the mistaken payment
cases in insurance law. Where an insurer pays proceeds to a policyholder or
beneficiary with awareness of the party's uncertain entitlement the insurer's right
to restitution is diminished, under the reasoning that the insurer assumed the risk
of the mistake. 47 Moreover, there is a significant line of authority that emphasizes
wrong person is ordinarily entitled to restitution (quoting United States Fiduciary & Guar.
Co. v. Reagan, 122 S.E.2d 774, 780 (N.C. 1961))).
144.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 6 cmt. f-Ill (Council Draft No.
1, 1999) (discussing mistaken belief that cover loss has occurred); III PALMER, supra note
54, § 14.7, at 167; id. § 14.11, at 188-89 (stating that restitution probably will be allowed
when life insurance is paid in the mistaken belief that the insured is dead, but noting some
cases to the contrary when payment is based on a presumption of death after a long
absence).
145.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 6 cmt. f-I. (Council Draft No.
1, 1999) (discussing mistake as to coverage); III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.13, at 196201 (discussing restitution where insurer mistakenly computes cash surrender value,
amount of paid-up insurance, or period of extended insurance). See also id. § 14.14, at 20109 (discussing restitution where insurer pays proceeds in ignorance of a fact that would be
the basis for avoiding the policy).
146.
See, e.g., Kansas Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Farmway Credit Union, 889
P.2d 784, 788-89 (Kan. 1995) (holding that insurer not entitled to relief based on mistake,
given that insurer assumed risk that insured absentee was not dead when it paid life
insurance proceeds to claimant); Wray v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 879 P.2d 725, 728
(Mont. 1994) (stating that insurer's assumption of risk that claimant was permanently
disabled bars equitable relief based on mutual mistake); Demos v. Lyons, 376 A.2d 1352,
1357-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (stating that bank's payment without checking
sufficiency of buyer's account is assumption of risk that waives restitution claim based on
mistake); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 cmt. d-III (Council Draft No. I,
1999) (stating that "the doctrine of voluntary payment bars a claim in restitution ...where
the payor has assumed the risk that the payment is not in fact due"). For discussion of
assumption of risk as a basis for denying a contracting party's relief based on mistake, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§

152-154 (1981).

147.
See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Yellen, 156 A.2d 36, 39-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959) (stating that insurer is entitled to recover mistaken payment unless it assumed
risk of mistake); Benson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(stating that insurer is entitled to recover amount of overpayment under collision insurance
unless insurer assumed the risk of mistake); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v Brown, 654 P.2d 716,
718-19 (Wash Ct. App. 1982) (stating that insurer who pays proceeds under mistake of fact
is entitled to restitution; an exception to general rule is triggered if insurer agreed to assume
the risk of mistake). See generally JERRY, supra note 1, § 99[e], at 658-61. Also, if the
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the need for finality of insurance payments, and these cases cut against insurers'
claims for restitution for mistaken payments in many contexts. 48 To summarize, if
the insurer's right to restitution for costs incurred in defending covered claims
depends on how courts have handled insurers' requests for restitution of payments
mistakenly made, how the defense cost reimbursement issue will be resolved is
uncertain.
Given the weaknesses in the duress and mistake arguments, the
reimbursement perspective is at its strongest when making a simple point: that the
insurer's defense of noncovered claims, a performance for which the insured
neither bargained nor paid, unjustly enriches the insured, and this entitles the
insurer to restitution. The anti-reimbursement perspective, however, is not without
significant counter arguments. Indeed, a court with pro-insured predilections can
articulate a well-reasoned decision denying the existence of a reimbursement right.
Perhaps the strongest argument against reimbursement is based on the socalled "incidental benefits" exception. 49 The general principle is as follows: If a
person (the "conferring party") who pursuant either to the performance of his or
her own duty or to efforts to protect or improve the person's own interests
incidentally confers a benefit upon another, the conferring party is not entitled to
restitution from the benefitted party. 50 This principle explains some situations
insurer pays proceeds to settle disputed claims, it follows that restitution is not appropriate,
even if, in hindsight, it turns out that the facts were not such as to obligate the insurer under
the policy. See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.7, at 169-70; id. § 14.11, at 189.
148.
See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.11, at 188, 193 (citing representative
cases).
149.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937) ("A person who,
incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or the improvement of
his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to
contribution."); II PALMER, supra note 54, § 10.7, at 418-22 (explaining that when plaintiff
does work for another party and there is substantial economic equivalence between what
plaintiff does and what plaintiff receives, plaintiffs recovery of incidental benefits would
give plaintiff an "added gain for no justifiable reason").
150.
The Restatement provision pertains to both performance of one's own duty
and "protection or the improvement of [one's] own things." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 106 illus. 2 (1937). Thus, for example, a party who drains a swamp on his own property
and, in so doing, benefits adjacent property is not entitled to restitution. See id. The
Restatement provision also refers to the conferring party not being entitled to
"contribution." The preceding sections of the Restatement refer to situations where a party
performing a duty or protecting his own interest is entitled to indemnity or contribution
from a third party. See id. §§ 76-105. Generally, contribution refers to the situation where
two or more parties are jointly responsible for the same obligation and one pays more than
the share for which he or she is responsible; the party who pays more is entitled to
contribution from the party who pays too little. Because the insurer and the insured are not
jointly obligated, the law of contribution does not explain why the insurer might be entitled
to reimbursement. See infra note 231. Section 106 states a principle that goes beyond the
contribution setting, as some courts have recognized when applying the section to situations
where joint obligors are not involved. See, e.g., Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White, 265 Cal.

Rptr. 525 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that property owner who built access road to landlocked
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where justice does not require a party to return a windfall to the conferring party.
For example, A's performance of a contractual duty owed B might benefit B in
collateral, incidental ways that go beyond the value of the received exchange. To
illustrate, A's construction of a beautiful home on B's lot might have the incidental
effect of raising the value of unimproved adjacent property owned by B, but this
enrichment is not unjust. The benefit has not been at A's expense given that A has
suffered no loss, and A is not entitled to retrieve the benefit under the law of
restitution.
The implication of the incidental benefits principle in the insurance
defense setting is as follows: The insured's receipt of a defense for noncovered
claims is, arguably, an "incidental benefit," which is justly retained and does not
constitute unjust enrichment. To elaborate, if the insured is sued for both covered
and noncovered claims in the same lawsuit, the insurer is obligated by the
insurance contract to defend the covered claims, and insurance law places a further
duty on the insurer to defend the noncovered claims as well, assuming it is
impossible to segregate the covered allegations and their underlying facts from the
noncovered ones. When the insurer defends the covered claims, it can be argued
that the insured, receives collateral, incidental benefits-namely, a defense to the
noncovered claims-from the insurer's performance of its contractual duty. The
insurer has no entitlement to restitution for these incidental benefits, which justly
belong to the insured.
A related point can be made by emphasizing how the insurer benefits
itself by undertaking the defense when coverage is in doubt. The underlying idea
is tha. f one confers a mutual benefit when acting to promote his or her selfinterest, the benefitted party is not unjustly enriched.' Not defending is a
dangerous alternative for the insurer, which risks liability for breach of the duty to
defend if its doubts about the existence of coverage turn out to be unfounded.'52
The alternative of defending unqualifiedly causes the insurer to waive the position

property not entitled to restitution for benefit to other property owners who benefitted from
road); Major-Blakeney Corp. v. Jenkins, 263 P.2d 655, 664-65 (Cal.' Ct. App. 1953)
(stating that plaintiff's construction of sewer, paving, and street improvements in plaintiffs
development, that incidentally benefitted adjacent property-owner, did not entitle plaintiff
to restitution for benefit conferred on defendant).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 2 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No.
151.
1, 1983).
When an expenditure is made by one person to the advantage of himself
and another, it is sometimes not evident whether any benevolence was
intended or not.... In the cases here considered a person has provided
benefit both for himself and for another, at expense to himself, by a
decision on which he had an opportunity to reflect. The other person
will usually have manifested assent to that decision, or at least have
acquiesced in it.... [T]he fact of mutual gain does not indicate unjust
enrichment, even when the cause is an expenditure on one side only.
Id.
152.
See supra note I 1l.
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it might wish to assert later-that the insurer owes no indemnity obligation. 153
Thus, defending under reservation, while beneficial to the insured, is also
beneficial to the insurer because the insurer protects and furthers its own interests.
The insurer retains control of the defense, which has been declared a valuable right
in many contexts."5 The insurer also retains control over any settlement with the
plaintiff in the underlying action,155 and the insurer has control over the choice of
counsel, which is important to conducting the defense in a cost-effective
manner.' 56 Furthermore, the insurer obtains the benefit of insulating itself from
liability for potentially large damages for breach of the duty to defend."5 7 Thus,
whatever benefits the insured receives in such circumstances are not unjustly
received.
This last point-that the insurer defends noncovered claims for its own
benefit-is one that some courts have found persuasive when denying insurers'
requests for reimbursement,'58 and thus it must be credited as one of the stronger
anti-reimbursement arguments. Yet the application of this principle in the
insurance setting is not invulnerable. 9 The incidental benefits exception is
See supra note 110.
154.
See, e.g., Jerry, supra note 13, at 175 & n.73 (discussing and citing cases);
Silver & Syverud, supra note 24, at 264-65.
155.
See, e.g., JERRY, supra note I, § 112, at 763-64; Silver & Syverud, supra
note 24, at 264-65.
156.
See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 1, § 11, at 731; Silver & Syverud, supra note
24, at 264-65.
157.
The existence of these benefits to the insurer when defending under
reservation was the basis for a pre-Buss California appellate court holding that the insurer
was not entitled to reimbursement of defense costs. In Travelers Inurance Co. v. Lesher, the
court explained:
The insurer who is uncertain whether coverage is provided under a
policy undertakes the defense of its insured under a reservation of rights
in large part to protect itself from a subsequent claim that it breached its
agreement with the insured. Although the assumption of the defense by
the insurer without doubt also benefits the insured, it is not primarily
undertaken for the insured's benefit.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 809-10 (Ct. App. 1986).
Lesher was approved in In re Hansel, 160 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993),
153.

Reliance Insurance Co. v. Alan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1990), and Insurance Co. of
the West v. Haralambos Beverage Co., 241 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434-35 (Ct. App. 1987). Also
adhering to this analysis is FederalInsurance Co. v. Susquehanna BroadcastingCo., 727

F. Supp. 169, 172 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1989). Lesher was explicitly disapproved in Buss v.
SuperiorCourt, 939 P.2d 766, 776 n.12 (Cal. 1997). See also Richmond, supra note 11, at
503 (referring to the mutual advantage argument, states that "[i]t is here that insurers' right
to reimbursement of defense costs is weakest").
158.
See Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1989);
supra text accompanying notes 77-80 (discussing Terra Nova); cases cited supra note 81.
159.
The Buss court specifically addressed and rejected the "incidental benefit"
rationale for denying the insurer a reimbursement right, but the inability of the court to
articulate a compelling basis for rejecting the rationale is some evidence of the argument's
strength. In a footnote, the court, referring to the passage from Travelers, quoted supra note
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arguably relevant only to situations where the conferring party performs the
totality of its duty and no more-that is, where there is no expense of additional
performance beyond the full performance that generates the benefits received. 60
The insurer who defends both covered and noncovered claims arguably does more
than full performance; the insurer fully performs (by defending the covered
claims) and "then some" (by defending noncovered claims). It is the "then
some"---the excess performance rendered by the insurer-that confers the
additional benefits. In other words, conceptualizing the insurer's performance as

"doing more than it owes" provides a rationale for escaping the incidental benefits
exception altogether and appeals to the restitution cases allowing a party that
"over-performs" its contractual obligation to recover the value of the excess
performance from the benefitted party. 6' Indeed, in any contractual relati6nship, a

party performs its contractual duty not only to further its own interests, which is
why the party entered into the contract in the first instance, but also to protect its
own interests, given that nonperformance of contractual duties exposes the party to
remedies for breach. Denying restitution whenever a purpose of a party's actions is
157, stated: "Such reasoning fails. It turns on motive. Motive, however, is 'hard.. .to
discern."' Buss, 939 P.2d at 777 n.14 (citation omitted). The court explained that the
subjective motive of any individual person is often not apparent, and the same is true if a
group of individual persons is the actor. As for a corporation or similar entity, the court
explained that motive is "purely fictive." Id. at 777-78 n. 14. Again referring to the quoted
passage, the court asserted that "[t]he analysis in the text does not attempt to fathom why
the insurer acts as it does subjectively, but merely looks to what results from its action
objectively." Id. Whatever difficulties may exist in ascribing a subjective motive to an
artificial person, it is indisputable that insurers defend under reservation of rights to avoid
the potentially calamitous consequences of failing to defend a covered claim on the one
hand and the potentially expensive concession involved if the claim is defended without
reservation and subsequently turns out, to be a noncovered claim. The insurer defends
under reservation to protect its own interests and things.
160.
Restatement of Restitution section 106 refers to the conferring of a benefit
"incidentally to the performance of his own duty," implying that the benefit is one which
arises out of the duty's performance, not a performance beyond the scope of and thus not
required by the duty. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937).
161.
Professor Palmer observes that "[t]here is almost no useful authority when
there has been a mistaken overperformance of an actual contract, corresponding in that
aspect to the mistaken overpayment of a debt. In the latter instance restitution goes almost
as a matter of course, but in the former there are factors working against restitution that
must be taken into account." III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.5, at 162-63. The example
which he then offers-a contractor's mistaken construction of a five-room house when the
contract only calls for four rooms-is distinguishable from the insurance defense situation
because the insurer knows about the possibility that no coverage exists when it provides a
defense. See id. § 14.5, at 163. This raises the question of to what extent the performer's
"doubt" about the obligation should affect the right to restitution, a subject to which Palmer
devotes an entire section. See id. § 14.7, at 166-74. Although acknowledging that the body
of case law is small, he contends that doubt, even substantial doubt, about what
performance is owed should not prevent a finding of relievable mistake, and he offers
numerous mistaken payment cases in insurance law to substantiate the point. See id. § 14.7,
at 166-71. For more on mistake, see supra text accompanying notes 137-148.
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to benefit the party's own interests emasculates restitution in all contractual
contexts, given that some element of self-benefit always exists whenever a party
undertakes to perform contract duties.'62
To summarize, the incidental benefit argument, although persuasive to
some courts, has uncertain reach and is therefore not conclusive on the question of
the insurer's reimbursement right. It may gain some strength, however, from a
second related argument which focuses on the insurer's control of the conferral of
the benefit. In performing the liability insurance contract, the insurer determines,
through its own independent assessment of the plaintiffs claims against the
insured and its unilateral decisions about whether and on what terms to provide a
defense, to what extent a benefit is conferred on the insured. The insured requests
a benefit when it tenders the defense to the insurer, but the insured's request is
made to preserve its rights under the contract. The insured does not control
whether a benefit is received and does not induce it through the insured's own act
or neglect. 63 As a passive recipient of a benefit deliberately and consciously
bestowed by the conferring party, the insured is enriched, but this enrichment is
not unjust. It is not essential that the benefitted party act affirmatively to seize a
benefit in order to give the conferring party a right to recoup it, but passive
beneficiaries tend to be on firmer ground should they subsequently face the
conferring party's claim for restitution."
A stronger version of this second argument claims that the insurer is a
mere volunteer, or "officious intermeddler," and should be denied restitution for
this reason. 6 ' The principal rationale for denying restitution in these circumstances
162.
An argument exists, however, that emasculating the idea that restitution is
available in the context of contractual transactions would be a good thing. See supra note
57. Note, also, that the defense of noncovered claims is not, from the pro-reimbursement
perspective, the performance of a contractual obligation.
163.
A counter-argument, discussed earlier, is grounded in duress; the insured, it
could be argued, can effectively coerce the insurer into defending noncovered claims. For a
more detailed discussion of this argument and its critique, see supra text accompanying
notes 129-135.
164.
Thus, when a contractor improves the defendant's property by mistake, the
contractor may be entitled to restitution, but the benefitted party's lack of knowledge,
reasonable reliance, and inability to "unwind" the improvement all cut against restitution in
this setting. See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.5, at 163-64. Likewise, a person who
mistakenly receives an insurer's payment may not have to make restitution if he or she
reasonably relies on it. See JERRY, supra note 1, § 99[e], at 659-60.
165.

See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 2 (1937) ("A person who officiously

confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor."); id. § 112 ("A person
who without mistake, coercion or request has unconditionally conferred a benefit upon
another is not entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was conferred under
circumstances making such action necessary for the protection of the interests of the other
or of third persons."). The Restatement (Second) of Restitution (Tentative Draft No. 1,

1983) articulated the concept as follows: "A person who receives a benefit through conduct
officious as to him does not owe restitution to the person so acting. A person acts
officiously when he intervenes in the affairs of another without adequate justification, such
as that which may be afforded by a request or a mistake." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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devolves from the concern that a party might foist benefits upon unsuspecting
people, using the law of restitution to create a right to payment for goods or
services where none would otherwise exist." To countenance such a right would
encourage those who have no viable market for their products or services to make
a living by trying to impose "deals" on persons who would prefer to be left alone.
Another rationale comes from the concern that the defendant may have
detrimentally relied on the receipt of the benefit, and that ordering its return might
leave the defendant in a worse position than the defendant was in before the
benefit was bestowed. 67 Although one could account for this reliance by allowing
a setoff from the restitution recovery, measuring the amount of reliance may be
difficult. Thus, a more pragmatic default rule is to deny restitution altogether
except in narrowly defined circumstances, such as where the benefit was bestowed
to protect the public health or falls into the category of "necessaries." '68 The
argument from the anti-reimbursement perspective is that the insurer has multiple
alternatives when a defense is tendered in circumstances where coverage is
doubtful, and one of those alternatives is not to defend at all. In opting to defend
under reservation, the insurer assumes the status of a "volunteer" and thereby loses
the restitution remedy.' 69
Viewing the insurer in this setting as a "volunteer" is problematic at
several levels. First, where a mixed action is involved, insurance law rules require
RESTrION § 2 .(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). The general principle is difficult in

application, however. In referring to these principles, Professor Dobbs states that "[b]oth
the rule and its terms may be misleading. The mistaken plaintiff is not always allowed to
recover unsolicited benefits, and the plaintiff who is not mistaken sometimes is." 1 DOBBS,
supra note 54, § 4.9(1), at 680.
This rationale is evident in Restatement (Third) of Restitution (Council Draft
166.
No. 1, 1999), which states:

A person who intentionally confers a nonbargained benefit on another
has no claim in restitution in respect thereof if the recipient's obligation
to pay compensation would ordinarily be based on a contract between
the parties, and if the circumstances of the transaction are not such as to
excuse the person conferring the benefit from the ordinary necessity of
basing a claim to payment on a contract with the recipient.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2(2) (Council Draft No. 1, 1999).
As explained in comment e, "[c]onsiderations of justice as well as efficiency require,
therefore, that voluntary transfers be made pursuant to contract wherever possible. The
consequence for the law of restitution is that restitution is not normally available to the
claimant who should have made a contract with the recipient but failed to do so." Id. § 2(2)
cmt. e.
167.
See 1 DOBBS, supra note 54, § 4.1(2), at 563 ("Innocent defendants must be
protected where they have changed position after receiving the enrichment and where they
would be placed under significant hardship if restitution is required of them.").
168.

See infra note 173.

169.
See Richmond, supra note 11, at 500-01 (stating that "[a]n insurer that
defends an action in which all of the plaintiff's claims clearly are uncovered surely does so
as a volunteer, such that no right to restitution will lie," but an insurer that defends a mixed
action does not do so voluntarily).
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the insurer to defend noncovered claims, which seriously undermines the
suggestion that the insurer voluntarily bestows a benefit on the insured. Second,
the insurer has an interest to protect (i.e., the insurer might be liable to defend
because the underlying claim might be covered) and this should be enough to
remove the insurer from the status of a volunteer.170 Third, the insurer does not
defend without request. 17 1 When the insured is sued, the insured tenders the
defense to the insurer, which is tantamount to the insured's request that the insurer
perform contractual obligations. The insurer who defends does so because of the
compulsion of these obligations, thus undermining the argument that the insurer
defends voluntarily.'" Finally, it is at least plausible to argue, although the
argument is a stretch, that the insurer's provision of a defense is akin to providing
"necessaries," which is one circumstance where the volunteer can recover
restitution.'" To summarize, for a variety of reasons, the insurer who defends an
insured pursuant to the obligations of a liability insurance contract is far removed
from the officious intermeddler who seeks to impose deals on innocent
beneficiaries.
A third reason the insurer's defense of noncovered claims arguably does
not confer an unjust enrichment is pertinent to mixed actions. The insurer's duty to
170.
See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.7, at 173 (explaining that if uncertainty
exists as to which of two insurers is responsible to pay for a loss and one insurer pays it,
that insurer will be granted restitution from the other on proof that the liability rested on the
second; the first insurer is not a volunteer because, at the time of the payment, it might have
been liable, which gave that insurer an interest to protect).
171.
See II PALMER, supra note 54, § 10.1, at 360 ("[T]he minimum meaning of
the term [volunteer].. .is that the benefit was transferred knowingly and without request of
the defendant.").
172
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITuTION § 14 cmt. c-Ill (Council Draft
No. 1, 1999).
Where payment is made in response to a claim that the payor knows to
be unfounded, the restitution claim must surmount the traditional
obstacle of the "voluntary payment doctrine." Properly understood, the
doctrine of voluntary payment bars a claim in restituion only where the
payor has assumed the risk that the payment is not in fact due, or where
the payment is strategic.... Either inference is excluded where it appears
that a payment of money not due has in fact been coerced.
Id. For more discussion, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
173.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 113 (1937).
A person who has performed the noncontractual duty of another by
supplying a third person with necessaries which in violation of such
duty the other had failed to supply, although acting without the other's
knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if
he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor.
Id. The problem with the argument that the defense is "necessary" is that most of the cases
recognizing the necessaries exception involve the provision of critical goods and services
(e.g., food, medicine, clothing, shelter) "usually considered reasonably essential for the
preservation and enjoyment of life." Id. § 113 cmt. d. Legal services, at least in this context,
seem to fall short of this standard. Moreover, in most of the cases, the benefits' conferrals
"were not inspired primarily by self-interest." II PALMER, supra note 54, § 10.4, at 374.
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defend noncovered claims in mixed actions is imposed by law-specifically, by
courts applying settled principles of insurance law.'74 The contract does not
impose this duty, but this arguably is beside the point. The insured's receipt of a
defense to noncovered claims is not unjust given that the duty-is one which courts
have stated should exist and ought to be fulfilled. Indeed, it is reasonable to assert
that whether a duty is imposed by law or contract, the insured expects that it will
be performed.
A fourth argument devolves from the distinction sometimes drawn
between implied-in-fact duties and implied-in-law duties. Implied-in-fact duties,
or contract terms, arise from the parties' agreement and are considered to be
implicit in the overall understanding of the parties.' 75 Implied-in-law duties are
obligations external to the parties' agreement, are not implicit in the parties'
understanding, and descend upon the parties from norms external to the
contract.'76 Arguably, the insurer's duty to defend noncovered claims is implicit in
the agreement. The insurer promises to defend suits alleging covered claims, and
this logically entails an implicit commitment to defend noncovered claims that
cannot be segregated from the covered ones. If the duty to defend noncovered
claims in some situations is something the insurer implicitly
agrees to do, the
177
insured's receipt of this benefit cannot be said to be "unjust.'
Finally, it is arguable that when the insurer provides a defense under
conditions of known uncertainty, it does not follow that the insured's receipt of
this defense is unjust. 1 78 As set forth above, the first three parts of the insurer's
undertaking when it defends under reservation involves the insurer acknowledging
the uncertainty of the scope of its duties in the given situation, stating that it will
defend the insured despite this uncertainty, and advising that it may contest the
duty to indemnify at a later time. 179 In such circumstances, the insurer knowingly
assumes an understood risk when conferring the benefit, which stands in distinct
contrast to the usual situations: where the benefitted party unlawfully seizes an
unearned gain from a wholly innocent plaintiff; 80 where the plaintiff confers an
excess benefit on the other party to a contract without awareness that the benefit is
not owed;' where the plaintiff confers a benefit on the other party to a contract

174.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § 111 [c][4], at 737-40 (discussing law relevant to
insurer's duty to defend mixed actions).
175.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 7.16, at 499 (distinguishing implied-inlaw terms from implied-in-fact terms).
176.
See id.
177.
Of course, if the insurer explicitly agrees to defend noncovered claims,
which was the argument made by the dissent in Buss, the enrichment conferred on the
insured is not unjust. See supra note 94.
178.
The potential effect of "doubt" on a restitution claim based on mistake is
discussed earlier. See supra note 161. See also supra note 136 (discussing effect of
insurer's strategic decision to defend on insurer's restitution claim).
179.
See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
180.
See supra note 120.
181.
See supra note 138.
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without awareness that the contract is unenforceable;' 82 or where the plaintiff acts
in an emergency to benefit another 83 -a circumstance where the law wishes to
encourage quick decisions to act unburdened by time-consuming reflection over
the extent to which compensation is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, a default
18 4
premise of insurance law is that doubts about coverage tend to go to the insured.,
Where the insurer is uncertain about the scope of the coverage it has provided.in a
given circumstance and opts to give the benefit of its doubt to the insured, it is not
apparent why the insured's receipt and ultimate retention of this benefit in
doubtful circumstances is "unjust."
The foregoing discussion has focused on whether, under established
principles of restitution, the benefit received by the insured who is defended for
some noncovered claims is one that unjustly enriches the insured, and the analysis
is inconclusive. If one adopts a view of restitution that gives equal or transcendent
weight to the plaintiff's loss, as distinct from the defendant's benefit,185 the
analysis is no more definitive. From the pro-reimbursement perspective, the
insurer's loss is its out-of-pocket payment for a benefit to which the insured is not
entitled under the contract. Yet it is not clear that this is a "loss" for the insurer.
The duty to defend noncovered claims is imposed by law, as discussed above; 86 to
the extent restitution is grounded in a theory that the plaintiff's losses should be
restored, it is not obvious why a plaintiff who has acted pursuant to a pre-existing
duty can be said to have suffered a loss deserving of restoration. Stated simply, if
one is obligated to act, the cost of acting is not a compensable loss.
Moreover, if the insurer anticipates (as it might, given that insurers know
about the duty, imposed by law, to defend some noncovered claims) that in a
predictable percentage of defenses of insureds some noncovered claims will be
defended, the insurer should be expected to collect premiums to cover these
expenses, spreading the risk of defending noncovered claims across the pool of all
insureds. If the insurer collects premiums to pay for defenses of noncovered
claims, the insurer passes the cost of defending noncovered claims through to all
insureds, and the insurer suffers no loss.' 87 Of course, one might argue that all
insureds in the risk pool suffer a pro rata share of the loss, and that the insurer
functions as a proxy for all insureds to retrieve the benefit bestowed and thus
restore the loss suffered by all insureds. The cost pass-through situation is a
challenging one for the law of restitution, and the cases have not handled the
problem consistently. The setting in which this issue has been most thoroughly
182.
See RFSTATEMENT OF RSTITUTION § 16 (1937) (discussing restitution for a
person who has paid money to another because of an erroneous belief induced by a mistake
of fact that in so doing he or she is performing a contract with the other that is not subject to
avoidance).
183.
See id. § 114 (discussing restitution relating to performance of another's
duty to a third person in an emergency).
184.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § 25A[c], at 134-36.
185.
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
186.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
187.
See Quinn, supra note II, at 604.
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considered is taxation, where the common fact pattern involves the state erring in
the collection of a tax on sellers, which the sellers then urge ought to be refunded
under a restitution theory.'88 The difficulty for the sellers' restitution argument is
that the tax is typically passed through to buyers in the form of increased prices, so
that the sellers suffer no loss. Courts have reached widely inconsistent results
when sellers make such restitution claims," 9 and this foreshadows difficulty when
the issue is confronted in the insurance context.
Nor is the analysis clarified if one focuses on an infringement to an
interest of the plaintiff, as opposed to a loss suffered by the plaintiff.90 The
insured does not invade a protected interest of the insurer's when the insured
exercises its contract right to request that the insurer provide a defense. Indeed,
seeking a defense is a legitimate exercise of the insured's rights. Moreover,
standard policy language requires that the insured give the insurer notice of the
9
loss as soon as reasonably practicable or else risk forfeiting the coverage.' '
Indeed, it is in the insurer's interest that early notice occur. 9 2 If the insured does
not act improperly in seeking a defense, it is difficult to argue that a protected
when the insurer is presented with such a
interest of the insurer has been infringed
93
request and thereafter acts upon it.'
D. Summary
A reasoned argument can be made under the law of restitution that the
insurer is entitled to reimbursement of defense costs expended in defending
noncovered claims. Given the malleability of restitution, a reasoned argument can
also be made that the insurer has no such right. The debatable parameters of
restitution suggest that reliance on this body of law to decide the issue will not
yield consistent results in the cases and will not provide either insurers or insureds
with a dependable basis for predicting outcomes in cases of first impression. The
next Part of this Article explains that, unlike restitution, contract law provides a
principled and dependable framework for analysis. Under this alternative
framework, an insurer who defends noncovered claims is entitled to
reimbursement of costs incurred in defending such claims. Thus, courts that have
used restitution to support the insurer's reimbursement right have reached the
correct result, even if a superior rationale exists for this outcome.

See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.20, at 246-58; William J. Woodward,
188.
Jr., "Passing-On"the Right to Restitution, 39 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 873, 885-909 (1985).
189.
See III PALMER, supra note 54, § 14.20, at 253-56 (discussing cases
reaching different results).
190.
See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
191.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § 81 [a], at 523-24 (discussing insured's obligation
to give prompt notice of loss).
192.
See id.
193.
See Quinn, supra note 11, at 604.
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III. INTERIM SETTLEMENTS OF UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INSURER'S REIMBURSEMENT RIGHT
Although the law of restitution is distinct from contract, it is closely
identified with contract because of the tendency to conceptualize legitimate claims
for restitution as reflections of what the parties would have agreed to do had they
thought or been able to bargain about the allocation. 94 It is, then, a relatively small
step from a restitution-based justification of an insurer's right to reimbursement of
costs incurred in defending noncovered claims to a contract-based justification.
Specifically, this Part contends that the insurer's reimbursement right, if it is not
the product of express agreement, inheres in an agreement implied from the
conduct of insurer and insured-an agreement to settle on a interim basis the
parties' dispute over whether the underlying claims against the insured are covered
and, therefore, whether the insurer owes the insured a defense. Before exploring
this implied agreement in the context of liability insurance defense, this Part first
examines the concept of interim settlement in the context of general contract law
principles.
A. Contract Law and the Concept ofInterim Settlement
In circumstances where contracting parties disagree over the extent of one
party's obligation to the other, the parties have essentially four alternatives: (1)
doing nothing; (2) rescinding the contract; (3) negotiating a complete reallocation
of all of the parties' obligations to each other; or (4) negotiating a commitment for
full performance under reservation. Rescinding the contract (the second
alternative) is rarely a satisfactory solution. That some kind of relationship
between the parties is valuable is proved by the fact that the parties contracted with
each other. Even as the parties disagree over what is owed under the contract, the
parties would agree in many situations that a relationship on altered terms is
preferable to having no relationship at all. In other situations, one party may no
longer value the contract, but there is unlikely to be mutual assent that rescission is
in the best interests of the parties. If the contract has been partly performed, it may
be impossible to unwind it; in that event, rescission is not even an option.
Of the remaining alternatives, a negotiated ex ante settlement (the third
alternative) is the best because the parties arrive at a mutually satisfactory
resolution of their disagreement. Such agreements are, however, not always
achievable. Imperfect information about the full range of possible gains and losses
when combined with the insecurities accompanying the reality that the parties'
first agreement failed to fulfill its intended purposes may prevent the parties from
successfully renegotiating their relationship. Also, if one party (let alone both)

194.
See supra note 59. This claim for restitution is not unique; the same could be
made for tort law. Because transaction 'costs and the uncertainty ex ante about who will
commit torts upon whom precludes contracts about compensation for certain kinds of losses
inflicted by one person upon another, tort law reflects what the parties would have agreed
to provide as compensation if they had been able to bargain ex ante about the remedy.
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perceives that the other has failed to comport with standards of good faith and fair
dealing, the resulting strains in the parties' relationship may render efforts to renegotiate fruitless.
The "do-nothing" alternative (the first alternative) leaves the deal where it
stands and the dispute unresolved. Nothing is done to alleviate the insecurity that
accompanies disagreement. The party whose obligation is the subject of dispute
will perform only to the minimum of what he or she believes is owed under the
contract, lest he or she assume the burden of establishing a right to retrieve what
was advanced to the other side. The disappointed recipient of this performance
will evaluate whether this minimal performance constitutes a material breach
entitling the recipient to suspend performance and perhaps treat his or her own
duties as discharged.'95 It is possible that the contract's performance will
disintegrate as the parties respond, sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly,
with what they each believe is a proportional response to the other side's perceived
shortfall in performance. As the spiral toward disintegration intensifies, the
significance of the dispute for the parties will escalate in direct proportion to the
other side's withholding of its contract performance. In fact, much more may be at
stake than the mere loss of bargain; consequential damages, which are often
considerably more substantial than the loss of the bargained-for exchange, may
come into play.' 96 If the party performing only minimally is subsequently
determined to have committed a breach, this party may be responsible for
potentially vast consequential losses, depending on whether, and to what extent,
the foreseeability and certainty limitations apply to the particular circumstances.
Between the alternatives of doing nothing and renegotiating all terms of
the deal rests a fourth alternative: full performance under reservation. If the party
whose performance is the subject of dispute (the "performing party") has
assurances that the other party will restore excess benefits received in the event it
is determined ex poste that only a minimal performance was owed, the performing
party may be willing to perform the full measure of the duty and postpone until

195.
Each parties' duties in a bilateral contract are conditioned on the absence of
a prior material breach committed by the other side. Thus, an aggrieved party is allowed to
suspend performance only if the other side's breach is material. A breach is material if the
performance is insubstantial; that is, the substantial but incomplete performance of a duty is

equivalent to an immaterial breach. For further discussion, see FARNSWORTH, supra note
116, §§ 8.15-.16;at 579-87.
196.
Damages to an aggrieved party's expectation interest when a contract is
breach generally equal the loss in value of the other side's performance (i.e., the loss of the
bargain) plus any other loss (i.e., incidental and consequential damages), less any cost or
loss that the aggrieved party has avoided by not having to perform. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). The loss in value of the other side's performance
will normally be capped by the value of that performance; but consequential damages are
potentially limitless. The risk of liability for enormous consequential damage is one reason
the unforeseeability and certainty limitations on damage recoveries emerged in the midnineteenth century. For more discussion, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, §§ 12.14-.15,

at 821-35.
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later the resolution of the disputed claim. 97 From the performing party's
perspective, this is advantageous because the other party receives the full measure
of what he or she claims, thereby eliminating the possibility that the performing
party might become liable for consequential damages. This is also advantageous to
the party receiving the performance because full performance is received in the
short run; even if the value of a portion of this performance must be refunded in
the long run, the party has not incurred consequential losses, and has avoided the
risk of being unable to prove the quantity of such losses or otherwise survive the
effects of contract law's foreseeability and certainty limitations upon the damage
recovery.' Also, the possibility that after receiving full performance the
performing party will recalculate the costs and benefits of pursuing the disputed
claim and decide to abandon it altogether should not be overlooked.
To state the foregoing relationships in other words, the full-performanceunder-reservation response to a dispute involves an interim settlement of an
unliquidated claim.' If A and B disagree in good faith about the extent of B's
contract obligation to A, A's claim on B is unliquidated. A and B should be able to
settle A's unliquidated claim on an interim basis on the following terms: B agrees
to perform to the full measure of A's demand, but without conceding and while
expressly reserving B's claim that B owes less to A. If it is subsequently
determined that B owed A less, then B is entitled to recover the value of the excess
performance B rendered for A's benefit. If it is subsequently determined that B
owed A the full measure of what A demanded, B has already fully performed,
thereby discharging B's duty.
In circumstances where A would suffer immediate loss should B render
only partial (or no) performance, this interim arrangement is beneficial. First, B's
full performance prevents A from suffering the immediate loss. Second, should it
be subsequently determined that A was entitled to the full performance, the interim
agreement is beneficial in that it prevents A from suffering (and B from being
liable for) damages, including consequential damages. Indeed, A's refusal to
accept B's offer of an interim settlement should foreclose A from recovering
consequential damages that could have been avoided by accepting the offer.2"
197.
This possibility is broached in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution: "The
payor who knowingly satisfies an unjustified demand may prefer to litigate the controversy
as a restitution plaintiff than as a defendant in the other party's contract action."
RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14 cmt. d-III (Council Draft No. 1, 1999). For
reasons discussed earlier, whether courts will sustain insurers' claims in the posture of a
restitution plaintiff is unpredictable. Yet, by the same logic under which one might desire to
be a restitution plaintiff instead of a contract defendant, an insurer may prefer to seek
reimbursement in the posture of a party pursuing claims reserved by contract as part of an
interim settlement of an unliquidated claim, as opposed to being a defendant in the
insured's action for breach of duty to defend.
198.
See supra note 196.
199.
An unliquidated claim is a claim which is disputed in amount. A liquidated
claim is a claim with respect to which the amount is not in dispute.
200.
This devolves from contract law's avoidability limitation, which, in the
language of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,holds that "damages are not recoverable
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Third, if subsequent events cause B to rethink its position and to agree with A (or
if new circumstances cause B to conclude that it is uneconomic to pursue the issue
further), the dispute is mooted without either party expending resources to resolve
it.
Interim settlements on these terms are not common, however, for several
reasons. First, if the dispute between the parties is a serious one, it is likely to be
accompanied by strains in the parties' relationship that make continued
performance of contractual duties difficult. In such circumstances, an interim
settlement, which necessarily involves continued performance of the contract, is
unlikely to be the first thing that comes to both parties' minds. Second, the
performing party (B in the foregoing example) surrenders certain strategic
advantages if litigation becomes necessary to recoup what is alleged to be the
excess benefit conferred. Specifically, the performing party, as the plaintiff in an
action to retrieve the excess benefit conferred on the recipient party (A in the
foregoing example), assumes the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the full performance rendered was not, in fact, owed. If, by way of
contrast, that performance had been withheld (as opposed to being given under an
interim settlement arrangement), then the recipient party would be the plaintiff
who alleges that a full performance was not given; as the plaintiff, the recipient
party would assume the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 350(1) (1981). As generally
applied, this rule requires the aggrieved party to accept reasonable substitutes offered by the
other party: "If the party in breach itself offers to perform the contract on terms less
favorable to the injured party, this may nevertheless be an offer of an appropriate substitute.
Such an offer is not one of an appropriate substitute, however, if it is conditioned on the
injured party's surrender of any claim to damages." FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 12.12,
at 814.. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. e (1981). In the
situation in the text, A contends that B would be in breach if B would give the smaller
performance that B claims is owed, and B denies this. This is similar to illustration 14 in
section 350 of the Restatement (Second), where F (the letter designation has been changed
from the Restatement to facilitate clarity in this note) contracts to sell a used machine to G
for $10,000, F breaches, and F offers to sell the same goods to G for $11,000. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 illus. 14 (1981). In these circumstances, G
cannot refuse F's offer and recover $25,000 in consequential damages caused by F's
breach, because these damages could have been avoided by accepting G's offer and then
recovering $1,000 from F for breach of contract. If, however, F's breach were its insistence
that G accept an older and therefore less valuable machine as full satisfaction of F's
performance under the contract (as opposed to charging a higher price for the same
machine), under the same logic G could not refuse F's offer and also recover consequential
damages caused by F's breach. Assume, further, that F claims it is obligated only to deliver
the older version of the machine, meaning that whether F is in breach is the subject of a
good faith dispute. The interim settlement in these circumstances would have F deliver the
machine to which G claims it is entitled, while reserving its right to obtain a reimbursement
should it establish that G was entitled to only the older version of the machine. Under the
logic of illustration 14, G could not refuse this offer while preserving its claim for
consequential damages caused by F's nonperformance.
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the performing party breached the contract (i.e., incompletely performed). In
addition, the performing party may sense strategic disadvantage in attempting, in
the role of a plaintiff, to convince a fact-finder that the performance was not owed,
given the performing party's willingness to give that performance under the
interim settlement. Third, the performing party may have legitimate concern that
the other party will be unable to return the value of the excess performance
rendered or to pay any judgment that the performing party might obtain.20'
Refusing to perform, thereby forcing the other party to sue for the performance,
avoids this risk. Of course, the party who believes he or she owes less than the
other side expects must weigh these disadvantages against the benefits of full
performance under reservation. Depending on the circumstances, the party might
conclude that the consequential damage risk associated with an ex poste
determination rejecting that party's more limited view of its contract obligations
outweighs the disadvantages of the interim settlement, and that the contract's
performance should proceed in accordance with the other side's view of what is
owed, subject to an agreement between the parties to resolve the dispute over what
is owed at a later time.
A legitimate concern with interim settlements is that if B is a repeat
player with more expertise in the subject transactions than A, 2" B might routinely
claim that B is not liable, either in part or at all, to A, and attempt to structure
interim settlements for all of its performances under all contracts it has with all
parties. If B's claim that less was owed is asserted after full performance pursuant
to an interim settlement and if A is correct that B's obligation was liquidated, B
will, of course, lose its claim and A is protected. Indeed, it is unlikely that post-full
performance claims will be routinely asserted by parties like B in situations where
the claim is illegitimate. If B is a rational participant in the market, B will not
systematically pursue claims it is likely to lose and incur the transaction costs
associated with bringing such actions.
201.
An escrow arrangement can relieve these concerns, thus making an interim
settlement of an unliquidated claim more palatable to the payor. In Sears v. Grand Lodge
A.O.U.W., 57 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1900) (discussed in III PALMER, supra note 54, at 167-68),
the insurer, after the insured had been missing for seven years, entered into an agreement
with the beneficiary pursuant to which $666, a portion of the proceeds, were paid forthwith
and "not to be returned in any event," with the balance to be placed in escrow for 15
months and then paid to the beneficiary if the company failed to show reasonable proof that
the insured was alive. Id. at 376. Before the $666 was paid, the insurer demonstrated that
the insured was living, and the insurer refused to pay any proceeds. The beneficiary's claim
for the $666 was upheld, under the reasoning that this sum represented a compromise of a
disputed claim through an agreed exchange of values, with the insurer bearing the risk that
the insured might be alive. See id. at 376-77. If, in this instance, one term of the settlement
had been that the beneficiary would reimburse the insurer's $666 payment in the event the
insurer could establish that the insured was living, then this agreement would more closely
resemble the interim settlements discussed in this section, and the insurer's reimbursement
claim would be enforced in a case where the insured's continued living were established
after the payment was made.
202.
As discussed in the next subsection, see infra text accompanying note 225,
an insurer is a repeat player in insurance matters, whereas an insured usually is not.
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The repeat player concern is of a different sort. Because responding to a
reimbursement action entails costs for the defendant,0 3 the concern is that B will
use the threat of a subsequent recoupment action to hammer down what A is
willing to presently accept to discharge B's liquidated obligation. Indeed, B might,
as a matter of customary practice, only give full performance under reservation
and threaten to subsequently seek to recoup part of what B performed for A. Even
if B has no intention to pursue reimbursement, the threat of doing so might be
sufficient to coerce some of the parties with whom B deals to give up some
benefits of the contract in order to avoid the subsequent costs of defending against
B's reimbursement claim. This problem is not, however, unknown to contract law.
Machinery exists to regulate, and hopefully deter, parties like B from threatening a
reimbursement action to extort A's assent to an arrangement under which B would
make a partial payment in full satisfaction of B's total obligation to A. For
example, if B's performance is liquidated, i.e., is not the subject of a good-faith
dispute, contract law is clear that B cannot discharge its duty through A's consent
to accept less than the whole performance. 2' This is one way contract law
responds to the concern that a party to whom a liquidated debt is owed might
surrender the claim under coercion. The general principle, simply stated, is that
liquidated debts cannot be discharged through payment of less than the whole."0 5
The foregoing general principle is, however, limited in the sense that the
coerced party's entitlement is to restore the status quo ante-in other words,
parties who subsequently realize they were pressured to abandon legitimate
contract rights may retrieve their former positions. But if such parties accept
partial settlement and do not thereafter complain, the injustice escapes sanction
and further attempts to extort benefits through illegitimate discharges might be
encouraged. Those contracting parties who believe that a significant number of
substitute agreements will never be challenged (and who are not otherwise
motivated to conduct themselves in accordance with standards of good faith and
fair dealing) will not be deterred from seeking to coerce discharges through partial
payments. From the coercing party's perspective, the worst that can happen is that
some substitute agreements will be challenged, and the coercing party will be
forced to pay what he or she agreed ex ante to pay anyway; to the extent
challenges are not made for some agreements, the coercing party profits.

203.
The most obvious costs are attorney fees and other expenses associated with
defending against the insurer's lawsuit.
204.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 278 cmt. c (1981) (stating that
"part performance by an obligor of a duty that is liquidated and undisputed is not
consideration for a discharge of that duty in full, even if the obligee so accepts it," and also
noting criticism of rule in circumstances where no unfairness exists in such a settlement);
id. § 73 ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the
subject of honest dispute is not consideration."); id. § 74 (discussing rules pertaining to
forbearance to assert or surrender of claim or defense which proves to be invalid).
205.
The case most often cited for the general principle is Foakes v. Beer, 9 App.
Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884), a decision which finds its way, through principal case or note, into
virtually every contracts casebook used by first-year law students.
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The party seeking to escape contractual obligations through part
payments acts, however, at some peril. At a minimum, when B's obligation to A is
liquidated, B's claim that less than full performance is owed makes A insecure.
This triggers the rules that allow A to request adequate assurance of performance;
B's failure to provide that assurance will constitute a repudiation of the contract,
which will allow A to suspend its performance under the contract and proceed
immediately to seek remedies for breach. 2" Moreover, if A is confident that B has
stated an intent to commit a material breach, A might skip the assurance of
performance machinery and take the position that B has repudiated the contract,
which, if correct, entitles A to remedies for breach and relieves A from its contract
duties.2 7 Furthermore, although a number of courts have been wary of concepts
like "good faith" and "fair dealing," it is appropriate to view B's attempt to
discharge a liquidated claim with less than full performance as a material breach of
the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by all parties with respect
to contract performance, 0 8 which is relevant to determining whether B's failure to
render or offer to perform is a material breach. 2"
If the foregoing is not enough to deter coercing parties from routinely
threatening reimbursement actions in order to induce discharges of liquidated
debts through partial payments, one would hope that the pressures of competitive
markets will force contracting parties to abide by standards of good faith and fair
dealing. To the extent the sharp practices of those seeking to escape contract
obligations become known in the market, the number of people willing to contract
with the opportunists will decline. Where competition is insufficient to force fair
dealing and to deter parties from seeking to discharge contractual obligations
through partial payments, governmental regulation-such as that which is
pervasive in the insurance industry-might be needed to secure the behavior that
market forces are unable to induce.210 In some markets, judicial interventionthrough, for example, recognition of the tort of bad faith-occurs. This kind of

206.
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981) (describing when
failure to give assurance may be treated as repudiation). This rule is a matter of statutory
law for contracts for the sale of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1978). "Whether there is a right
to assurance under contracts other than those for the sale of goods is still unclear, [with]
some courts extending UCC 2-609 by analogy and others declining to do so."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 8.23, at 616.
207.
See RESTAT'EMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 253 (1981) (stating that where
obligor repudiates duty prior to breach by non-performance, repudiation gives rise to claim
for damages for total breach and discharges the obligee's remaning duties to render
performance).
208.
See id. § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
209.
See id. § 241(e) (stating that "the extent to which the behavior of the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair
dealing" is significant to the determination of whether the party has committed a material
breach).
210.
For discussion of insurance regulation as a response to market failures, see
JERRY, supra note 1, § 20, at 51-54.
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regulation might be explained as that which naturally arises when both competitive
pressures and direct governmental intervention are inadequate."'
B. Interim Settlements in the Liability InsuranceContext
It is a common practice for insurers to provide defenses under a
reservation of right to contest coverage at a later time,212 and this procedure is
properly understood as an interim settlement of an unliquidated claim. The insured
who has been sued contends that the plaintiff s allegations in the underlying action
are covered, and that, therefore, the insurer owes a duty both to defend the insured
and to provide indemnification against any resulting judgment. The insurer doubts
that coverage exists, but without further investigation the insurer is unwilling to
take the unequivocal position that no coverage exists. In such circumstances, the
insured's claim upon the policy is the subject of a good faith dispute and is, hence,
unliquidated. Rather than deny coverage, the insurer proposes the following
arrangement to the insured: The insurer offers to defend the claim at its expense
but reserves the right to contest coverage at a later time and obtain reimbursement
of defense costs incurred in the event it is demonstrated that coverage does not
exist."3 The insured accepts this offer, realizing that, whatever disagreements the
insurer and insured might have, it is preferable in the short run to receive the
benefit of the insurer's performance of the defense obligation. 1 4
If the insurer and insured expressly agree to the foregoing interim
settlement, a "nonwaiver agreement" is created. 215 The nonwaiver agreement is a
bilateral contract, under which the insurer and insured jointly recite that the
insurer's defense of the insured shall not be understood as the insurer's waiver of
its right to later contest coverage and, perhaps, also seek reimbursement of defense
costs incurred. In insurance defense practice, nonwaiver agreements are much less
common than the insurer's practice of unilaterally sending the insured a
reservation of rights letter, in which the insurer announces-and does not
specifically invite the insured's assent-that it is providing the defense under a

211.
For discussion of the tort of bad faith in the insurance context, see JERRY,
supra note 1, § 25G, at 151-62.
212.
See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
213.
Exactly what the insurer would be entitled to recover in the event the actual
facts show that no coverage, in fact, existed depends on how the court in question views the
duty to defend-in other words, whether the jurisdiction follows the "eight comers" or
"potentiality" rule. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40. If, for example, the
jurisdiction follows the potentiality rule and the actual facts show that no coverage, in fact,
existed but there was nevertheless a "potential" of coverage are certain times, the insurer
would be entitled to reimbursement for defense costs only after it became clear that there
was no potential of coverage or for defense costs incurred in defending those claims in a
mixed action for which there was no potential of coverage. These questions are beyond the
scope of this Article, but will be explored in a forthcoming piece on the subject.
214.
See supra text accompanying note 198.
215.
For more discussion of nonwaiver agreements, see JERRY, supra note 1,
§ 114[c][3], at 795-98, and supra note 118.
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reservation to later contest coverage and, perhaps, seek reimbursement of defense
costs.2" 6 There are several reasons the nonwaiver agreement is relatively rare.
Securing policyholders' assent to the nonwaiver agreement involves additional
transaction costs (i.e., it is easier to send a letter than to secure the insured's assent
to a collateral agreement). Doubt exists as to whether the policyholder can sign the
agreement without the advice of independent counsel.217 And, at least where the
insurer wishes to preserve the ability to later contest the indemnity obligation, the
insured's assent to the reservation is unnecessary. 29
That the insured's expressed assent to the insurer's reservation is
unnecessary is beyond serious dispute when the insurer's performance of contract
obligation "A'--the defense obligation-is independent of the insurer's contract
obligation "B"--the indemnity obligation." 9 Because a reservation of right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs involves the insurer performing obligation "A"-the defense obligation-while reserving the right to take back some of that
performance at a later time, it does not necessarily follow that the logic favoring
unilateral reservation of rights to contest independent duties is appropriate when
the reservation involves taking back a portion of what the insurer intends to
provide. In other words, the question is whether the general principle-unilateral
reservations are permissible, and the policyholder's expressly manifested assent is
unnecessary-changes when the reservation concerns the performance which is
being rendered for the policyholder, that is, when the reservation pertains to the
insurer's defense obligation.22
216.
See Richmond, supra note 11, at 469-70.
217.
See JERRY, supra note 1,§ 114[c][3], at 796.
218.
See I WINDT, supra note 25, § 2.17, at 67-69; id. § 2.19, at 70-71 (noting
that "a reservation of rights letter and a nonwaiver agreement provide the insurer the same
amount of protection"); Richmond, supra note 11, at 506 ("In most states, the insured need
not consent to the insurer's reservation of rights in order for it to be effective.").
219.
For discussion of the independence of these duties, see supra text
accompanying notes 14-19.
220.
A similar question can be asked of the indemnity obligation: Is it possible, in
circumstances where the defense is being provided under reservation to contest coverage,
for the insurer to settle the underlying litigation and reserve a right to obtain reimbursement
of the settlement amounts in the event it is determined that the plaintiffs claim(s) against
the insured are outside the coverage? In this situation, like the reimbursement of defense
costs situation, the insurer performs an obligation-indemnity-while reserving a right to
claim that the indemnity duty was not owed on account of lack of coverage and to retrieve
the funds that were advanced to resolve the underlying claim. Most courts to consider this
question have held that the insurer can obtain reimbursement of settlement funds if the
insured has authorized the settlement and agreed to reimburse the insurer in the event the
insurer prevails on the coverage issue, or if the insurer has notified the insured of a
reasonable offer and given the insured the opportunity to assume the defense. See, e.g., Mt.
Airy Ins. Co. v. Doe Law Firm, 668 So. 2d 534 (Ala. 1995); Johansen v. California State
Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bur., 538 P.2d 744, 750 (Cal. 1975); Val's Painting and Drywall,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 273-74 (Ct. App. 1975); Medical Malpractice
Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Goldberg, 680 N.E.2d 1121, 1127-29 (Mass. 1997);
Matagorda County v. Texas Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk Mgmt. Pool, 975 S.W.2d
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When the relevant principles of contract law are brought to bear on the
question, it is clear that the answer-the insured's expressly manifested assent is
unnecessary--does not change. Assume that X has a bilateral contract with Y, and
that the parties disagree about the scope of Y's contract obligation, the
performance of which requires X's cooperation to some extent. In simple terms, X
contends that Y must do more, and Y contends that Y owes X less. Y is unwilling
to give the performance which X demands that Y provide if that means
surrendering Y's claim that Y owes X less. Y is willing to give a more limited
performance, but X is unwilling to accept Y's limited performance. Y, of course,
cannot force its limited performance upon X. Y, however, is willing to perform in
the more expansive manner that X demands on the condition that X commits to
reimburse Y for the costs of Y's performance beyond that which Y contends it
owes should Y later succeed in establishing that Y, in fact, owed X less. When Y
tenders this proposed interim settlement, X has two alternatives: accept Y's
proposal or decline it. If the proposal is accepted, the dispute over the scope of Y's
duty is postponed to a later day. If the proposal is declined and Y's performance is
not forthcoming, X is relegated to entering into a substitute transaction with
another party and pursuing whatever remedies X has against Y for breach.
Whether X will recover in its action against Y will depend on the merits of the
underlying dispute between X and Y."'
In addition to either accepting or declining Y's offer of an interim
settlement, does X have a third alternative-declining Y's offer but taking the
benefit of Y's performance? In other words, can X accept Y's performance while
simultaneously rejecting the condition Y attached to it? The answer is, and must
be, no. Under contract law's principles of offer and acceptance, one cannot accept
a tendered performance while unilaterally altering the material terms on which it

782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), review granted (June 29, 1999). This, however, is not
inconsistent with the analysis, developed in the text, that the insured's express agreement to
the insurer's claim of right to reimbursement of defense costs is not needed. As with
reimbursement of defense costs, see supra note 45, a specific policy provision authorizing
reimbursement of settlement funds in the event the insurer prevails on the coverage issue is
enforceable. See National Cas. Co. v. Lane Express, Inc., 05-96-00444-CV, 1999 WL
219437 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1999).
221.
Note that X should be foreclosed from recovering consequential damages,
under the reasoning that these damages could have been avoided by accepting Y's offer of
an interim settlement. See supra note 200. In the insurance setting, however, this outcome
is not certain. For example, most courts have held that when an insurer breaches its duty to
defend, the insured takes no steps to arrange for substitute counsel, and a default judgment
is entered, the insurer assumes the risk that the insured will hire no attorney and the insurer
is responsible for the default judgment up to the policy limits. See JERRY, supra note 1,
§ I11 [i], at 760-62. This answer rejects the view that the insured's idleness in response to
the insurer's breach is a failure to take appropriate steps to avoid the foreseeable
consequences of the insurer's breach. Extending from the logic of these cases, it could be
held that an insurer, when offering an interim settlement proposal, assumes the risk of the
insured's noncooperation in response to the insurer's refusal to provide a full, unqualified
defense.
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was offered.' Thus, X cannot accept Y's offer while simultaneously altering one
of its material terms; that is, X cannot decline Y's offer of an interim settlement
while taking the benefit of Y's performance. 2 In other words, X's acquiescence
in and acceptance of the benefits of Y's performance constitute a manifestation of
acceptance of the terms on which Y's performance was tendered.224
The preceding section discussed the concern that repeat players, lacking
regard for considerations of good faith and fair dealing, might routinely propose
interim settlements as part of a strategy of hammering down what the other party
will accept to discharge a liquidated claim. Translated to the insurance defense
setting, the insured's concern is that some insurers will routinely defend under a
reservation to seek reimbursement of defense costs in order to coerce insureds to
accept partial defenses or disadvantageous settlements. If coverage is legitimately
in doubt, the defense under reservation is not improper. 225 If, however, the
222.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 cmt. a (1981). ("A
qualified or conditional acceptance proposes an exchange different from that proposed by
the original offeror. Such a proposal is a counter-offer.... The effect of the qualification or
condition is to deprive the purported acceptance of effect."). See also id. § 19(2) (stating
that conduct of a party manifests assent if the party "intends to engage in the conduct and
knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he
assents").
223.
This fact distinguishes cases involving an insurer's claim for reimbursement
of settlement expenditures because the underlying claims were found to be outside
coverage. Counsel appointed by the insurer cannot defend the insured without the insured's
cooperation and acquiescence in the lawyer's appearance on the insured's behalf in the
underlying litigation. In other words, the insured must at least tacitly agree to accept the
lawyer's services; thus, there is no need to append an additional "explicit agreement"
requirement as a prerequisite to the insurer's reimbursement right. In contrast, a settlement
of the underlying action can occur without the insured's cooperation; thus, the cases
deciding the ifisurer's reimbursement right have opted, for the most part, to require the
insured's agreement or specific authorization to the settlement. See cases cited supra note
220.
224.
This principle is recognized in some of the cases which recognize the
insurer's reimbursement right. See, e.g., Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian,
726 F. Supp. 777, 784 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that insured's acceptance of defense
adequate to show insured's "understanding" of insurer's right to reimbursement, even if
insured objects to the reservation of rights); Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687
F. Supp. 502, 505 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (requiring agreement or understanding; insured's
silence while acquiescing in insurer's provision of defense pursuant to explicit reservation
is sufficient to enable insurer to recover defense costs), affd, 902 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1990);
Frank and Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 686 (Ct. App. 1996)
(observing, in dicta, that "the law permits an insurance company to condition an acceptance
of defense on a later right to contest coverage or to seek reimbursement of defense costs").
But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 756 F. Supp. 440, 445-46 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(stating that for an insurer to obtain reimbursement, "the record must reflect 'an
understanding between the parties"'; insured's silence in response to letter reserving right to
reimbursement, even though insured accepted defense, is not an agreement or
understanding between the parties).
225.
See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
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existence of coverage cannot be the subject of a good faith dispute, the insurer's
practice would be tantamount to attempting to discharge a liquidated claim
through less than full performance." 2 In such circumstances, the insured who has
second thoughts and decides to challenge the discharge ex poste would be entitled
to restoration of the status quo ante." Moreover, the insurer's practice would be
vulnerable to attack on grounds that the announced intention to do less than a full,
unqualified defense constitutes a repudiation of the contract, thereby entitling the
insured to whatever damages can be proved and to suspend the performance of its
own duties. 8 Of greater concern to the insurer should be the possibility that a
court would find the insurer to have breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which in some jurisdictions triggers the award of tort danages. 9
Moreover, a pattern of conduct of this sort should attract the interest of insurance
regulators, who presumably would seek to discipline the insurer appropriately.
One hopes, of course, that competitive pressures in the market place would render
such judicial and administrative remedies unnecessary.
The implications of the foregoing analysis is that the insurer has a right to
reimbursement for costs incurred in defending noncovered claims, assuming that
the insurer reserves its right to assert the reimbursement claim before it undertakes
the defense. An express agreement between insurer and insured that the insurer has
a reimbursement right is enforceable. Absent such an agreement, most courts and
commentators have reasoned that the right exists pursuant to the law of restitution.
This view is not unanimously held, however, and the malleability of the law of
restitution allows plausible arguments to be asserted in support of the divergent
views. If restitution law remains the framework for deciding the issue, one can
anticipate courts in jurisdictions that have not yet considered the question reaching
inconsistent results. As explained in this section, the insurer's unilateral
reservation of the right to seek reimbursement preserves the right if the insured
accepts the benefits of the defense provided by the insurer. Thus, courts that have
recognized a right to reimbursement based on restitution have reached the correct
result, even though there is a firmer foundation for that outcome in the law of
contract and the concept of interim settlement of an unliquidated claim.

226.
See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
227.
Efforts to settle liquidated claims by giving less than what is owed in
exchange for an immediate release are unenforceable. See supra note 119. If the settlement
is invalid, the liquidated claim remains due and owing, meaning the status quo ante is
restored.
228.
The damages suffered by the insured are likely to be nominal. The insurer
who offers a qualified defense, i.e., one accompanied by a reservation of rights, still
promises to defend the insured fully in the underlying action. More significant is the
insurer's loss of its right to insist upon the insured's performance of its duties, such as the
duty of cooperation, and to insist that all conditions to the insured's rights be satisfied.
229.
See JERRY, supra note 1, § 25G, at 151-58 (discussing the insurer's liability
in tort for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing).
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IV. FINAL THOUGHTS: A NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT RIGHT
To this point, this Article has examined whether the insurer's claim for a
right to reimbursement of defense costs incurred in defending noncovered claims
can be grounded in sound legal doctrine, and the answer given is yes. A remaining
question, among several others," 0 is whether this answer is a good one. If allowing
insurers to seek reimbursement of defense costs incurred for defending
noncovered claims is a bad idea, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that there
is plenty of room for courts to articulate rationales, even if they are doctrinally
flawed in one respect or another, that will deny the insurer that right. The
normative inquiry must go beyond the issues presented in cases where the insurer
claims and the insured resists a reimbursement right. In such settings, the battle
lines are already drawn, and the arguments to be advanced are predictable. Rather,
the inquiry must be whether the reimbursement right should be part and parcel of
the bargain struck between insurer and insured in the liability insurance contract.
Where it is cost-effective for the insurer to assert the reimbursement right,
the right's successful prosecution will result in a recovery for the insurer that
reduces total claims costs. In this sense, the reimbursement right is closely related
to the insurer's subrogation and contribution rights."' If an insurer pays proceeds
to the insured for a loss caused by and properly attributable to a third party, the
insurer's assertion of subrogation rights not only enables the loss to fall on the
party who caused and bears responsibility for it, but also reimburses the insurer for
the proceeds paid to the insured, thereby reducing the insurer's total claims costs.
If an insurer pays a claim to an insured which is also covered by another insurer's
policy, the insurer's assertion of a contribution right against the other insurer
reimburses the insurer for sums expended in compensating the insured for a loss,
thereby reducing the insurer's total claims costs. Of course, just because a right to
reimbursement, contribution, or subrogation exists, it does not follow that it is
efficient for the insurer to pursue it. In many situations, the costs of prosecuting
the claim outweigh foreseeable benefits, and in that event the claim should not be
pursued. With respect to subrogation and reimbursement in particular, the
possibility that the person whose financial participation is being sought will have
no or extremely limited resources is a real one, and pursuing a valid claim against
an insolvent defendant makes little sense. In such circumstances, policyholders
230.
See supra note 13.
231.
For more discussion of subrogation, see JERRY, supra note 1, § 96, at 60027. Contribution is most commonly employed in the "other insurance" clause context. See
generally id. § 97, at 627-51. Subrogation and contribution are equitable remedies which
are, of course, closely related to restitution. See I DOBBS, supra note 54, § 4.3(4), at 604
("Subrogation is another equitable remedy in which tracing is used to prevent unjust
enrichment and to give effective relief to the plaintiff."); id. § 4.3(4), at 607-08 ("The right
to contribution from a co-obligor is also an equitable restitutionary claim which is enforced
to prevent unjust enrichment."); I PALMER, supra note 54, § 1.5, at 21-24, 29-33.
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will not want the right to be pursued, instead preferring that the insurer save the
expenses of doing so.
To the extent it is cost-effective to pursue reimbursement and thereby
reduce total claims costs, the insurer should be able to offer less expensive liability
insurance to policyholders. This ability is meaningless if insureds do not desire
less expensive liability insurance, but it is reasonable to assume that, all other
things being equal, insureds prefer to pay less for coverage. Of course, some
insureds may prefer more elaborate coverage-specifically, defense insurance
pursuant to which the insurer bears the cost of defending noncovered claims. 2
But unless all insureds prefer more elaborate coverage over less expensive
coverage, which cannot even be known if insurers are foreclosed in the first
instance from offering less expensive insurance alternatives, courts should not
adopt default rules that preclude the offering of less expensive liability insurance
products. On the contrary, the default presumption should be a rule that enables
the offering of cheaper insurance, leaving it to the market to discover whether
insureds prefer only the offering of more extensive-and more expensivecoverage. Thus, the default legal rule should allow reimbursement rights to be
created and enforced; if insureds prefer that insurers not have this right and are
willing to pay the higher premium associated with higher claims costs, the market
will produce this product.
Indeed, it may be that there is sufficient demand in the market to support
multiple products-liability insurance with a reimbursement right, and more
expensive liability insurance without a reimbursement right. In fact, if one
assumes the absence of costs associated with product differentiation, insurers
should offer both products. Because insureds do not expect ex ante defenses for
noncovered claims 3 and because some insureds will not want to subsidize the
defenses of other policyholders for noncovered claims, one would anticipate a
viable market for the less expensive product. Once, however, the costs of product
differentiation are taken into account, it may be that the expenses associated with
drafting clearly differentiated policies and explaining their ramifications to
insureds will outweigh the premium reductions that can be offered those who
prefer the less expensive liability insurance with a reimbursement right. If this is
the case, the market should settle upon the product that is preferred by most
policyholders. To enable this sorting to occur, however, courts should give the
market the flexibility it needs to facilitate this choice. To that end, courts should
apply the relevant legal doctrines in a manner that supports insurers' efforts to
reserve rights to seek reimbursement of costs incurred in defending noncovered
claims.

232.
See supra note 42.
233.
This does not mean that defense insurance for some claims not covered by
the insurer's indemnity obligation is inefficient in all circumstances. See supra note 42.

